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2Foreword
Personalisation in social care is a development affecting UNISON members across the 
UK – as members of the social care workforce, members of the public, family members, 
carers and service users.
UNISON fully supports the principles of personalisation. Everyone should have as much 
independence and control over their own care and support as is right for them.
But we fear that the current funding gap in social care means that this policy could over-
promise and under-deliver.
This report, commissioned by UNISON from Professor Land and Professor Himmelweit, 
offers a timely social and economic analysis of the tension between personalisation 
policies and an ongoing drive by governments for cost containment in social care 
provision.
The report highlights the false economies and shifting political sands that underlie some 
of the policy making around personalisation. And it also makes the case for a sea 
change in how society values predominantly women’s work in social care – both paid 
and unpaid.
I am confident that this report will make an invaluable contribution to the debate as well 
as offering up some practical alternatives from other countries’ experiences. In particular 
it is heartening to see that where the political will is there, more personalised care and 
support can be delivered without casualising the workforce, undermining the rights of 
care workers, or over-burdening service users and their families.   
Dave Prentis
UNISON general secretary
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4Social care is in the news again. There 
is widespread recognition that the 
current system of social care provision 
is unsustainable. As in other areas of 
health and welfare services, a concern 
to increase choice while securing value 
for money, has led to a view, shared by 
government and opposition alike, that 
‘personalisation’ will solve many of the 
problems of the current system of social 
care and render it sustainable. This report 
examines this argument.  
The current sense of urgency driving social 
care up the policy agenda in the UK and 
many other countries is fuelled in part by 
what is often described as a demographic 
‘time bomb’. On the one hand an ageing 
population will increase the need for and 
cost of social care. On the other, we will 
have relatively fewer working age adults 
and this will reduce the capacity of families 
to care, as well as shrink the traditional 
sources of labour on which the social care 
workforce has depended. In addition there 
is increasing dissatisfaction with:
•	 the current allocation of the costs of 
social care between those needing 
care, their families and the state 
•	 the rising costs of social care and 
particularly of residential care, as 
labour costs increase 
•	 the distribution of public funds 
for social care, which is not only 
inadequate but appears to be 
distributed unfairly between and within 
local authorities in different parts of the 
country
•	 the quality of care available across 
the whole social care sector, raising 
important issues about the pay and 
conditions of the social care workforce
•	 the lack of coordination between 
social care and health care made 
worse by a distinction between the 
two which often seems arbitrary; with 
costs passing from health to social 
care and on to the individuals needing 
care, their carers and their families
•	 increasing pressures on informal 
carers, who are now more likely to 
be trying to combine caring with paid 
employment while being expected to 
carry more responsibility as funding 
fails to reach all but the most frail or 
disabled. 
These are not new issues. Many of the 
challenges facing us today are woven 
into the history of care services for 
adults needing care because of illness, 
disability or the frailties of old age. 
Demographic forecasts have always been 
an important part of the context within 
which these services have developed. 
Cost-containment has never ceased to 
be an important policy goal. In the current 
gloomy economic climate and faced with 
imminent cuts in public expenditure at 
both local and central government levels, 
the public funds available for social care 
are likely to be restricted and the costs of 
care will fall more heavily on those who 
need these services and those who care 
for them. This, as we argue in this report, 
coincides with the necessity to increase 
expenditure on care just to maintain 
current standards and address current 
levels of need. 
Social care services have been on the 
margins of the welfare state for a long 
time, not least because of ambivalence 
among the public and the policy makers 
about how formal and informal care should 
be combined. In comparison with health 
Introduction
“The task of carers is not prized by society, despite it being 
the most dignified of all” 
(A carer quoted in Green Paper, Shaping the Future of Care Together, 2009 p11)
5care, which remains free at the point of 
use and provided on the basis of needs 
through a national system funded from 
general taxation, the commitment to social 
care as a public service is much weaker. 
Social care services remain means-
tested services, the responsibility of 
local authorities, provided primarily when 
the family does not. Concerns that the 
availability of publicly funded care services 
or payments for care would undermine 
incentives for families to provide care 
have shaped policy, although the extent of 
informal care (by women in particular) has 
always dwarfed that provided in the formal 
sector. Perhaps because of an assumption 
that it should ideally be provided ‘free’ by 
a female family member, care and the care 
workforce have always been under-valued. 
However, there have been some important 
changes, particularly in the past 20 years:
•	 with rising costs of care and increasing 
employment rates among women, 
including older women, the distribution 
of these costs (in both time and 
money) both between the generations, 
and between men and women, and 
the role of the state in determining this 
distribution have become increasingly 
contentious issues
•	 the boundaries between health care 
and social care have been redefined 
and drawn ever more tightly, changing 
the resources available for social care, 
increasing demands on the social care 
workforce and raising expectations of 
individual and family responsibility
•	 resources from the social security 
budget in the form of cash benefits in 
recognition of the costs of disability, 
chronic illness and frailty have been 
expanded on the one hand, but 
some have been transferred to local 
authority budgets to become means-
tested on the other
•	 an increasing proportion of first 
residential care and then domiciliary 
services are provided through the 
market by private contractors
•	 devolution within the UK has resulted 
in social care policies developing 
differently in some respects in the four 
countries which make up the UK. For 
example, all have introduced direct 
payments but only local authorities in 
England offer personal budgets. The 
key differences are discussed in the 
report. 
There have been also shifts in influence on 
policy on social care:
•	 people with physical disabilities, 
mental illness or special learning 
needs are no longer confined in large 
institutions and now expect to live fully 
in the community. They have become 
more visible and vocal in the policy 
debates 
•	 the role of informal family carers, who - 
if female - are now far more likely to be 
in paid employment than their mothers 
were, can no longer be taken for 
granted. Older men are more likely to 
be carers in their later years than their 
fathers were. Increasing recognition of 
the scale of the care family and friends 
provide has also given them a stronger 
voice 
•	 there has been a purposeful shift 
in influence on the development of 
formal social care policies towards 
those who use the services, and to a 
lesser extent their informal carers, and 
away from those who directly provide 
them.
Nevertheless, although the implications 
are rarely explicitly acknowledged, there 
has been a constant theme running 
throughout debates on social care policy, 
both past and present, which concerns 
the very nature of care. Good care 
depends on the quality of the relationship 
between the giver and receiver of care. 
This is so whether care is provided within 
the family, by a friend or volunteer, or by a 
member of the paid workforce. 
Relationships based on trust take time to 
build and sustain. Managing the tension 
between a relationship based on contract 
6and one based on affect is difficult 
whether it takes place in the public or 
the private sector. The success or failure 
of any social care policy must ultimately 
rest on the acknowledgment that unlike in 
many other parts of the modern economy, 
there is an irreducible time component to 
good care. This is true whether that care 
is provided ‘free’ by informal carers or 
by waged workers paid by the state, by 
private sector care providers or directly by 
those needing care or their families. In an 
economy in which nearly everything else 
can be produced faster than ever before, 
this means that the opportunity costs of 
providing the time that good care requires 
rises. A society that wants its older and 
disabled people well looked after needs to 
devote the necessary resources to it, and 
the opportunity costs of those resources 
inevitably rise. This too needs to be 
acknowledged.
However the rising opportunity cost of the 
time that care takes is a result of society 
becoming richer not poorer. Claims that 
as a society we can no longer afford the 
costs of care are nonsensical. If these 
costs could be afforded in the past, when 
GDP and standards of living were lower, 
they can be afforded now. We may have 
to devote a larger proportion of current 
resources to them, but those resources 
themselves are far larger, so that to do so 
still leaves everyone with more disposable 
income. The decision about what 
proportion of overall national resources to 
devote to funding care is a political one, 
and one that reflects the importance a 
country puts on the well-being of its most 
vulnerable citizens. To say that providing 
good care is no longer affordable is not 
only absurd, it fails to confront that political 
truth.
7The development of 
care services: a historical 
perspective
The current debate about personalisation 
can be understood more fully when it is 
placed in a  historical context. This shows 
that some of the dilemmas and problems 
confronting policy makers, practitioners, 
care workers and families today are 
longstanding. For example, the boundaries 
between health and social care services 
have always been contentious, not least 
because in the UK responsibilities for 
funding and delivering them have always 
been different. Minimising the use of 
residential care has been a policy objective 
throughout the post-war years. History 
also shows that when local authorities 
provided domiciliary services directly 
in the form of the home- help service 
it was popular among those who used 
the service and most home helps were 
sensitive to the needs and wishes of their 
clients. ‘One size fits all’ is not an accurate 
description of the domiciliary care service 
before it was privatised.  The relationship 
between the person needing care and the 
person providing it is a key determinant 
of high quality, safe care and today it 
is important to understand under what 
conditions personalisation fosters and 
sustains good relationships.
Post-war developments
In 1948 the responsibility to provide 
residential care for those needing it was 
given to the new local authority health 
and welfare departments. In the decades 
following the second world war, the 
majority of elderly residents continued 
to be poor and disproportionately those 
who had never married or had no (or no 
surviving) children (Townsend 1962). 
Local authorities at that time had no 
statutory duty to develop domiciliary 
services to help disabled, chronically 
ill or older people in their own homes. 
During the second world war when, to 
the surprise of the policy makers, the 
conscription of single women left large 
numbers of chronically sick and frail elderly 
people needing support at home, local 
authorities were encouraged to develop 
services to help them. They continued 
to do so after the war and in 1967 there 
were over 62,000 home helps in England 
and Wales visiting nearly a quarter of a 
million households (Hunt, 1970 p3). These 
services were means-tested and also 
allocated disproportionately to those who 
had no children, daughters or daughters-
in-law in particular, either living nearby or 
with them (Hunt 1970, Land and Parker, 
1977). It was very clear that the state only 
stepped in when family failed. 
The 1970s: a changing 
relationship between domiciliary 
and residential care
The Seebohm review of social services 
in 1968 led to a major shake-up of 
social care administration, with social 
services departments created from the 
former children’s and health and welfare 
departments in 1971 (Parker, 1990). 
Although domiciliary services were nearly 
left out of the review, they now became a 
statutory service included in the new social 
services departments for the first time. In 
order to meet the unmet needs of current 
recipients of the home-help service and to 
provide a service to those eligible but not 
receiving it, it was estimated that the size 
of the service would need to be doubled 
or trebled (Hunt,1970 p25). 
Domiciliary care was seen as preferable 
to residential care, not only because it 
was less stigmatising but also because 
the running costs of residential homes 
were set to increase, as many of the 
8unmarried women who accounted for 
the majority (two thirds) of their staff 
would soon be retiring (Williams, 1967).  
Except in the smallest homes owned and 
run by a married couple, the residential 
care sector would have to adjust to the 
higher costs of increased staff turnover, 
part-time employment and shift working 
of non-residential staff who, like home 
helps, wanted working hours which 
fitted in with their family responsibilities. 
As Parker later wrote: “The residential 
home can no longer rely on the availability 
of single women; squeezed out of the 
housing market by their status and ready 
to dedicate a lifetime’s work to the care of 
others” (Parker, 1988, p7). This historical 
comparison is of interest today when, from 
the point of view of the residential care 
provider or the person needing a live-in 
carer, migrant workers (see Canganio et al 
2009, Gordolan and Lalani, 2009) replicate 
some of these cost-saving ‘virtues’ of 
the single woman in the past. Similarly, 
migrant workers may not always be so 
available. 
The pay of home helps was low, 
because, as now, little value was placed 
on the skills required for care work. 
Not only was it women’s work but it 
was work done everyday in the home 
and therefore the skills and experience 
required to be a good home help were 
taken for granted. Many of the home-
help organisers thought that the service 
was neglected in comparison with other 
services and that it had “…a status 
lower than is commensurate with the 
duties it undertakes” (Hunt, 1970 p352). 
The Williams committee, reporting in 
1967, took a similar view of employment 
conditions in the residential care sector: 
“Unfortunately there has not been in 
the community as a whole a general 
recognition of the importance of the work, 
nor of the knowledge and skill required to 
do it well. Too many people have assumed 
that this is the kind of work that can be 
done by any reasonably kind person” 
(Williams, 1967).
Care in the community
The economic and political context in 
which social care policies developed 
changed substantially in the following 
decades. Following the economic crises of 
1974 and 1976, capital spending on local 
authority residential homes was stopped 
and hospital development cut back. 
Community care, including residential care 
(see DHSS, The Way Forward, 1977), 
was seen not only as a way of keeping 
people out of expensive hospital beds but 
also of returning them more quickly from 
long-stay hospitals and geriatric wards. 
The average length of stay in geriatric 
wards fell by half between 1975 and 1985 
(Parker 1990b, p20). 
The home-help service did not keep pace 
with the growing numbers of people aged 
over 75 years (Parker, 1988) and home-
help organisers tended to spread their 
home helps across as many clients as 
possible, with the very old or housebound 
or those living alone most likely to receive 
help. The service remained very popular 
with clients, and effective in providing 
them with the practical help they needed 
(Sinclair and Williams, 1990, p167). In 
particular the home help service was: 
•	 a ‘lifeline’ for their clients with severe 
disabilities who believed they could 
not stay in the community without their 
help 
•	 valued by carers looking after 
confused elderly relatives by relieving 
them of some of the physical work of 
caring, providing general support and 
company and enabling them to get 
out
•	 there was also evidence that 
receipt of the service improved the 
mental health of carers looking after 
relatives with dementia. Male carers 
particularly appreciated home helps, 
perhaps because they belonged to 
a generation of men who, compared 
with men today, were less involved in 
domestic matters. The involvement of 
a home help reduced the likelihood of 
9the person for whom they were caring 
being admitted to residential care.
Criticisms of the service (ibid p168) 
included that:
•	 there were large inequalities in levels of 
provision between local authorities
•	 the service was spread too thinly
•	 there was a lack of flexibility in the 
tasks the home help would  do 
•	 insufficient attention was paid to 
rehabilitation and encouraging clients 
to do things for themselves
•	 contact and co-ordination with other 
services was lacking.
These are familiar criticisms and 
addressing them has continued to be a 
challenge for all concerned.  Collaboration 
in general between health and social 
care in the community was difficult, 
requiring work across geographical 
boundaries some of which, since the 
1974 reorganisation of the NHS, did not 
coincide. As Derek Wanless, reflecting on 
the 1970s, wrote: “Attempts to improve 
the coherence of health services were 
arguably at the price of creating further 
barriers, gaps and overlaps with local 
authority social services” (Wanless 2006, 
p12). 
Co-ordination between services also 
involved negotiations with different 
professional groups not made easier 
by tight budgets in competition for ever 
scarcer resources. Where costs could be 
shifted from one budget to another they 
were, usually to the detriment of social 
care services.
The road to the market 
The cuts in expenditure on public 
social services in the 1970s were 
further entrenched by the Conservative 
government in the 1980s. There was a 
commitment to roll back the state and 
encourage community care, meaning care 
by family and friends, together with the 
voluntary sector and the wider community. 
However, a change in the board-and-
lodgings rules within the means-tested 
social assistance system unintentionally 
fuelled an explosion of the private 
residential and nursing home care sector, 
undermining the intended reduction in 
elderly people relying on residential care 
(Parker,1990b  Land, 1988). Because 
central government picked up the bill, local 
authorities had a strong incentive to place 
older people or younger disabled people 
needing care in a voluntary or private 
residential care home, rather than either 
placing them in one of their own homes or 
offering them domiciliary services. 
The availability of affordable residential 
care meant for the first time older people 
could choose not to rely on limited 
domiciliary services, although a number 
of research studies suggested that often 
the choice was made by their families 
rather than the older person themselves. 
Residential care places increased from 
39,000 to 93,000 with the annual cost 
to the DHSS rising from £10 million in 
1980 to £1 billion in 1989 (Parker, 1990b). 
Between a quarter and two thirds of 
older patients discharged from hospital 
went straight into residential care (Parker, 
1990a. p20) with health authorities also 
taking the opportunity to close long-
stay hospitals, particularly for people 
with learning disabilities, knowing that 
by transferring patients to private and 
voluntary care homes the social security 
system would pay their fees (Glennerster 
and Korman et al, 1989). By the end of the 
decade two thirds of these residential care 
places were found in the private sector. 
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Meanwhile, consistent with the preference 
for care in the community and the savings 
that entailed, the home-help service was 
re-designated the ‘home-care’ service and 
the scope of what it did was expanded 
although it was to reach fewer people. 
The nationally negotiated job description 
for home carers stated that in addition to 
domestic tasks their duties included:
“…physical tasks approximating to 
home care (including dressing, washing 
and feeding clients), and social duties 
(including talking with clients, helping 
clients maintain contact with family, 
friends and community, assisting 
with shopping and recreation), aimed 
at creating a supportive, homely, 
atmosphere where clients can achieve 
maximum independence.” (Sinclair and 
Wiulliams1990, p164)
This job description and its more holistic 
aim bear a close resemblance to those the 
disability movement and others have been 
campaigning for today. 
However in many local authorities, the 
opportunity to expand the home care 
service in the direction envisaged was not 
taken for the following reasons:
•	 the organisational structures within 
most local authorities, which were 
needed to effect such a change, were 
lacking
•	 the remaining difficulties of joint 
planning and co-ordination between 
health and social services, already 
mentioned, had not been overcome
•	 there was little room made for 
participative planning involving what 
would now be called user groups or 
stakeholders
•	 more resources were not forthcoming 
and home-care organisers had little 
opportunity to influence the allocation 
of existing resources
•	 the new home-care service involved 
the concentration of services on fewer 
people, so it became less popular and 
had less political influence than if it 
had been more widely available and 
appreciated.
As a result, despite the pressure on 
them to do so, local authority home-
care services did not expand to provide 
a more intensive service for those with 
the greatest needs in order to support 
them longer in the community. But nor 
did a market of private-sector providers 
spontaneously develop in the way in 
which board-and-lodging payments had 
created a market for residential care. In 
theory, it should have done so; based on 
the Exceptional Circumstances Allowance 
(ECA) introduced in the mid-sixties for 
supplementary benefit claimants who 
were paying for domestic help provided 
either by a local authority or a private 
arrangement. Most private arrangements 
would have involved the claimant 
becoming the employer, as few agencies 
existed at this time. The payment covered 
the wages paid (provided these were 
‘reasonable’) plus the employer’s national 
insurance contribution. In rare cases the 
ECA could be used to pay for permanent 
live-in help.1 The ECA was never available 
to pay for domestic help provided by 
relatives, although it could be used to 
pay expenses incurred by them (for 
example, for travel). Perhaps more people 
would have claimed if they had known 
about the allowance; its availability was 
not publicised by the campaign groups 
representing older people or people with 
disabilities.
1 They could receive a maximum of twice the ordinary 
scale rate for non-householders in 1980 - up to £34 
weekly. It was assumed they lived rent-free and only 
half the allowance received was needed to cover their 
maintenance (DHSS, 1980 p47)
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From 1980, the payment was limited to 
those paying for private domestic help, 
but a formal market in domestic help and 
care barely existed. At most only 16,000 
annually claimed this ECA. Roy Parker 
estimated that there were no more than 
300 commercial agencies operating in 
the mid-1980s, employing at most 4,000 
mainly part-time staff and assisting up to 
60,000 households. This represented 7% 
of households who privately employed 
domestic help (Parker, 1990, p321)2. 
Writing in 1990, reflecting on the previous 
decade, he concluded: “… the prevailing 
character of private domestic help sector 
was (and is) not such that the availability of 
a subsidy would serve to stimulate either 
its growth or its transformation into a 
number of formally organized enterprises. 
This amongst other things makes it 
exceedingly difficult for local authorities 
to consider providing all or part of their 
home-help service by purchase from the 
private sector.” (Parker, 1990a, p325). 
After 1993, local authorities had no choice 
but to do so. 
2 Roy Parker, using the 1986 Family Expenditure 
Survey figures had estimated that over a million retired 
households (16%) purchased domestic help  This 
included 350,000 dependent on state pensions and 
735,000 of those with additional sources of income 
(Parker, 1990a, p317). At this time there were 123, 000 
home helps in England and Wales assisting 475,000 
elderly people (three quarters aged 75 or more) (ibid, 
p318). Including Scotland, the number was about 
600,000 (ibid, p322).
From providers to managers 
of care: a challenge for local 
authority social services
Determined to put an end to the costly 
and ‘perverse’ incentives in favour of 
using residential care, the government 
transferred the budget for residential care 
from the central social security budget 
to local authorities. The budget was 
only ring-fenced initially. It thus ended 
the system whereby older people could 
enter residential care funded by the state 
with only a means-test, but without any 
assessment of their need to do so or 
whether their needs could be met by 
cheaper domiciliary care. 
In order to sustain and develop the 
private sector in residential care and push 
domiciliary care into the formal market, 
local authorities now had to spend 80% of 
their social care budget in the private and 
voluntary sectors. At the beginning of the 
1990s local authorities’ own home-help/
care services were providing over 90% of 
the publicly funded domiciliary care hours. 
By 2008 in England this had fallen to a 
little over a quarter.
This move to impose private and voluntary 
sector provision was justified by the belief, 
held by the Conservative government of 
the day and the subsequent New Labour 
government, that provision for a market 
is the best way of ensuring good quality 
and value for money. Public provision, 
according to this view, because it is not 
subject to competition in the market tends 
to be inefficient and poor value for money. 
If those who purchase services have 
a choice of providers they will choose 
those that produce the best quality for the 
money that they spend. The most efficient 
providers will therefore win custom and 
expand. Less efficient providers will have 
to improve the quality of what they provide 
or reduce their costs if they are to survive. 
Through such processes of adjustment, 
overall efficiency will improve, raising 
quality and/or cutting costs. 
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These were the changes that paved 
the way for the later introduction of 
‘personalisation’ and direct payments. 
The first step on this road was for local 
authorities to become managers rather 
than being providers of social services. 
As a result they were responsible for co-
ordinating the market where necessary 
and – through exercising choice on 
behalf of their clients – for safeguarding 
standards and ensuring value for money. 
Every person in need of social care 
would have a case manager to assess 
their needs and arrange the necessary 
combination of services. 
The move to community care was also 
fuelled by a determination on the part of 
central government to keep both older 
people and younger people with chronic 
illness or disability out of expensive 
residential or hospital care. As a result 
the boundaries between health care and 
what has now become social care were 
drawn ever tighter. In 1995, an estimated 
610,000 people in the UK received 
home-care services and 530,000 were 
visited by community nursing services 
(Royal Commission on Long Term Care, 
1999, p9). This compares with 1980 
when in the UK, district nurses were 
visiting over a million households, three 
times as many as visited by home helps 
(Social Trends, 1980). Home carers 
now did on a means-tested basis what 
district nurses did without charge as part 
of the NHS in the past, and gradually 
domestic work effectively dropped off 
their job description. “Home care won’t 
clean…it’s not allowed” (Home care 
recipient Commission of the Social Care 
Inspectorate (CSCI) 2006, p36). 
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Current developments
The shift from residential to 
domiciliary care
The Royal Commission on Long Term 
Care proposed in 1999 that ‘personal 
care’, that is care which involves touching 
the body, should be provided free on 
a similar basis to health care. This 
was introduced in Scotland and the 
Welsh Assembly is also committed to 
introducing free personal care, should it 
have the resources to do so. In England, 
personal care continues to be means-
tested, whether provided in residential 
or domiciliary services. Local authority 
social care budgets have not kept pace 
with costs. Indeed local authorities in 
England have had to make 3% annual 
efficiency savings for each of the past 
few years and are expected to do until at 
least 2011(Letter from the Deparment of 
Health to Association of Directors of Adult 
Social Services and Local Government 
Association leaders, Sept 2009). As a 
result, in most local authorities, only those 
with the most severe or critical needs now 
receive this means-tested support, and its 
reach may become even more restricted.
The policy, adopted in the early 1990s, 
of targeting the home-care service at 
the most dependent people, means 
that those receiving home care funded 
by local authorities are now far more 
likely to have complex needs and higher 
levels of dependency than in the past. 
In England and Wales between 1990 
and 2005, although the total number of 
contact hours increased substantially, 
from an average of 3 to over 10 hours 
per week per household (the threshold 
for defining ‘intensive care’), the numbers 
of households receiving such care fell 
in the same period by a quarter, to 
395,000 (Commission of the Social Care 
Inspectorate (CSCI), 2007, p.20). The 
numbers have continued to fall (CSCI, 
2009) and those with straightforward and 
modest needs are now very unlikely to 
receive services arranged by their local 
authority.
The announcement that, from October 
2010, personal care in England would 
be free for the most dependent people 
living in their own homes irrespective of 
means, is consistent with the policy of 
keeping people in the community as long 
as possible. “The key aim of the policy…
is to enable, support and encourage 
more people to avoid or delay entering 
residential care” (Personal Care at Home 
bill, explanatory notes, para 23, 25 
November 2009). It is estimated that 
about 280,000 older people in England 
would qualify and get on average 6.5 
hours of free personal care a week (Impact 
assessment of Personal Care at Home 
bill p16, 25 November 25). Those living 
in residential homes will not qualify and 
neither will those with an informal carer 
who is receiving support, such as a direct 
payment or a service under section 2 
of the Carers and Disabled Children act 
2000. 
In other words, while consistent with what 
most people say they want, free personal 
care is also a cost -containment measure. 
From the end of 2012, local authorities 
will be expected to spend no more than 
40% of their adult social care budget 
on residential care compared with the 
current average of 46%.This compares 
with 62% in 2002-03 (CSCI, 2009). This 
reduction is expected to offset some of 
the cost to local authorities of introducing 
such free personal care (estimated to be 
£250 million in a full year) (Pre-budget 
report 2009). In total the introduction of 
free personal home care will add £670 
million to the national social care budget. 
This may be met in part by restricting 
or removing older people’s eligibility for 
the non-means-tested, non-contributory 
Disability Living Allowance or Attendance 
Allowance. Transferring resources from 
the social security budget to social care 
budgets with more restrictive eligibility 
rules, as discussed above, is also not a 
new policy. 
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Changing demands on 
residential and domiciliary 
carers 
Keeping very dependent people in their 
own homes as long as possible may not 
always be cheaper than supporting them 
in residential care, unless the domiciliary 
services provided are far from adequate 
(Lewis, 1998; Wanless, 2005). It is clear 
that the residents of care homes are now 
older, more dependent and more likely to 
be suffering from dementia, as 40% did 
in 2007 (CSCI, 2009). This puts greater 
demands on staff, making appropriate 
training even more important, especially 
with respect to medication, and raises 
costs. It has increased the rate of turnover 
of residents which can cause cash-flow 
problems for the owners. An increased 
number of bedridden people has also 
placed new demands on domiciliary 
care. In 2007, a fifth of home care hours 
were for overnight/ live-in care or 24-hour 
care. Sixteen per cent of care hours were 
outside ‘normal’ hours (CSCI, 2009, p36). 
Those who need assistance getting in 
and out of bed do not want to be helped 
to bed in the early evening or to stay in 
bed until the late morning. Some need to 
get up in time to go to work. The demand 
on home carers to be ‘flexible’ in their 
working patterns has increased and may 
not fit easily with the demands of their own 
families. Young migrant workers without 
family responsibilities are very attractive to 
home-care agencies in this respect.
The time spent on each visit has also 
declined, reducing the home carers’ ability 
to respond sensitively to their clients’ 
needs. There is little time for talk. Too often 
carers are given a prescribed list of tasks 
to be done and recorded. This inevitably 
reduces motivation. Ever shorter visits 
and their inappropriate or unreliable timing 
have become a source of much discontent 
for both givers and receivers of care 
(CSCI, 2006).
A comparison in this respect with the 
situation of home helps in 1970, when 
a study was conducted in England and 
Wales by the government social survey, 
is instructive (Hunt 1970). Then just over 
a quarter of the people visited by home 
helps were housebound and less than 
2% were bedridden. Personal care was 
not in their job description; their work 
consisted mainly of domestic tasks. At this 
time district nurses, although belonging 
to the NHS, were employed by local 
authorities, and were, as we have seen, 
undertaking what are now described as 
basic personal-care tasks such as bathing, 
managing incontinence and giving routine 
medication.1 Both home helps and district 
nurses were expected to be concerned 
with the well-being of their clients.
On average home helps visited four clients 
a week, spending between four and five 
hours a week with each of them. Three 
quarters of the recipients had only one or 
two visits a week and would have liked 
more visits rather than longer ones. The 
home helps on the other hand would 
have liked to have spent longer with their 
clients. Only a quarter had visits lasting 
less than one-and-a- half hours. Nearly 
half began their visits between 9 and 10 
am. Nine out of ten recipients reported 
that they were content with the timing of 
the visits and were satisfied overall with 
the service they were receiving. 
1 In 1969-70 district nurses visited 562,000 elderly 
people in their homes in England and Wales. This 
compares with 376,000 elderly people visited by home 
helps (Social Trends 1970). 
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There was time to talk. “The great majority 
of all types of recipients enjoyed having 
a cup of tea and a chat with their home 
helps and indignantly denied that time was 
wasted by home helps in this way.” (Hunt, 
1970, p18). Most referred to their home 
help as a friend and indeed many home 
helps reported doing more than they were 
paid to do (ibid). The Hunt (1970) study 
illustrates that the essential nature of care 
has not changed. Good care takes place 
within a relationship based on trust and 
familiarity and this takes time to develop 
and sustain.
The state of the current 
‘market’ in social care
The contrast with current conditions is 
some indication of where cost-cutting 
leads providers competing in a market, 
when what is being provided is not a 
standard economic good but the personal 
service of care. Another indication is the 
state of the market in the social care 
sector. By 2008 there were nearly 5,000 
home care agencies in England, 84% in 
the private and voluntary sector. This is 
more than double the number in 2000 
when such agencies had to be registered 
for the first time. Local authorities 
purchase 80% of the care they provide 
and one in six agencies relies entirely 
on local authority income (CSCI, 2009). 
There is evidence that some agencies are 
uncertain about their capacity to manage 
individual clients, although others enjoy 
the contact with them. When clients 
stop paying suddenly because they are 
in hospital or have died it may be weeks 
before outstanding accounts are settled. 
For small agencies the impact on their 
cash flow may be hard to manage (UK 
Home Care Association, interview). Most 
agencies have less than 50 clients on their 
books and a minority have more than 100 
(CSCI, 2009).The market is far from stable: 
“…the home sector is a fragile one, still 
reliant on small private providers and in a 
prolonged state of flux” (CSCI, 2006, p29). 
For every two registrations of new private 
sector providers, one ceases (CSCI, 
2009). It is significant that in countries 
such as France where home care 
agencies have been widely used for much 
longer, the market is characterised by a 
small number of large agencies, mainly in 
the not-for-profit sector
The labour market is not stable either. In 
England the domination by providers in the 
private sector has led to major recruitment 
and retention problems, with vacancy 
rates across the sector nearly double 
the average for all types of industrial, 
commercial and public sector employees 
(Skills for Care, 2008, p70). Turnover rates 
for all care staff are high overall at 22%, 
but highest for care workers in the private 
sector at 25% compared with 15% in the 
voluntary sector (idem). 
The increased need for training 
and staff development
One way to retain workers would be 
to provide a good career structure and 
staff development. But about a quarter 
of private sector providers of both home 
care and residential care do not even 
meet minimum standards concerning staff 
development and training compared with 
less than a fifth of providers in the local 
authority and voluntary sector (CSCI 2009, 
Appendix B). Many do not even have 
information about the qualifications of 
their staff (Skills for Care 2008, p11). The 
proportion of staff with higher qualifications 
is much smaller in the largely private social 
care sector than the almost entirely public 
health care sector, suggesting the latter 
has a much clearer career structure and 
well supported paths to move up through 
it (see Table 1 below).
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Of course, private-sector providers will not 
invest in training staff where there is high 
turnover. The logic of the market would 
suggest that social-care staff should 
invest in their own training. However, 
they will not do so while pay levels fail 
to reflect qualifications attained. In 2007 
acquiring an NVQ level 3 qualification 
improved wages by 20p/hour over a level 
2 qualification, and an NVQ level 4 made 
no further difference (ibid p 83). 
Since good-quality care depends on the 
development of a sustained relationship 
between carer and care recipient, high 
staff turnover is significant problem. 
Workers cannot be retained without a 
career structure based on training for 
individual career development. This 
requires public investment in training 
because, as we have seen, individual 
employers do not have the incentive to 
provide training, nor individual workers the 
resources to fund their own training. 
Training needs to be worthwhile for both 
for employers and workers. There are now 
government funds available for training. 
In England these are set to increase as 
part of the latest social care workforce 
strategy including the new social care 
apprenticeship scheme (Department 
of Health, 2009). The social care 
development grant, which is increasing 
to £192 million this year, also includes 
funds for staff training. However, the 
existing Department of Health grants – the 
HR development strategy grant and the 
national training strategy grant available 
across the whole social care sector – 
were under-spent in 2006-7 (Skills for 
Care 2008, p11). Although councils spent 
two thirds of their allocation on their own 
workforce and the rest was spent on the 
independent sector, the HR development 
strategy grant was under-spent by nearly 
£10 million and the national training 
strategy grant by £29 million. Perhaps 
this is because even funded training 
requires both a commitment to reward 
trained junior staff and the time of senior 
staff to supervise or mentor them, both of 
which competitive pressures undermine. 
Inadequate staff supervision is still a 
significant and worrying weakness in both 
the residential and home care sector (Care 
Quality Commission 2009, p 16). It is in 
the very nature of care, that while a trained 
worker should provide better care, training 
does not greatly reduce the number of 
staff needed. If the quality of care provided 
does not affect how much a private sector 
provider is paid, there is little incentive to 
employ more expensive trained workers, 
let alone to train them.
Table 1  
Highest level of qualification held by main occupation 2007
SOC2000  
occupation groupings
Nursing auxiliaries and 
Assistants  
%
Care assistants and  
home carers  
%
NVQ 4 and above 27.9 11.5
NVQ level 3 22.7 20.2
Trade apprenticeships 1.9 2.1
NVQ level 2 18.1 32.5
Below NVQ 14.5 12.1
Other qualification 7.8 12.9
No qualification 7.1 8.8
Source CSCI 2009, p 112 Table 8.7 based on Labour Force Survey
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These problems with the private 
sector provision of care are not wholly 
unexpected. Many, as we shall see, also 
apply to ‘personalisation’, which just takes 
the logic of privatisation one step further. 
Privatisation was an agenda founded in 
mainstream neoclassical economic theory 
(LeGrand 2007). It was based on the 
idea that ensuring there were competing 
providers and giving purchasers choice 
would improve the quality of services and 
value for money. By putting purchasing 
power directly in the hands of the care 
recipient, personalisation takes this 
idea to its logical conclusion. Neither 
privatisation nor personalisation promote 
choice just for its own sake, or because 
the purchasers of care services, local 
authorities and care recipients respectively, 
always want it. Rather choice is necessary 
to the operation of a competitive market. 
What is sought is the market’s process of 
disciplining providers to reduce costs, so 
that only the most efficient survived.
However, that same economic theory 
points out that for a market to achieve 
these goals depends on certain 
conditions:
•	 that purchasers are able to the assess 
the quality of what they are/would 
be purchasing, and have sufficient 
information to compare the prices 
which alternative suppliers would 
charge 
•	 that the costs of operating in the 
market, in particular acquiring such 
information and acting upon it are 
negligible 
•	  that any other transaction costs are 
not high enough to impede entry 
and exit for suppliers and purchasers 
switching between them
•	  that the market is competitive, 
i.e. that individual suppliers and 
purchasers are insufficiently powerful 
to influence the market on their own
•	 that the interests of purchasers 
and the ultimate consumers exactly 
coincide.
Applying market logic to care
These conditions may apply to a greater 
or lesser extent in the market for many 
goods, but care is not a standard good.  
The very nature of care as a personal 
service that involves the development of a 
relationship between care giver and care 
recipient means that these conditions do 
not automatically hold in the market for 
care, and even special efforts made to 
create them may not be successful. 
First, the quality of care is hard to assess 
and monitor. Care is a quintessentially 
‘soft’ product whose essential 
characteristics are not easily measured. 
It is possible to monitor the attainment of 
certain physical tasks, such as, whether 
a client has been bathed or taken their 
medicine. Market- driven provision, in its 
drive for efficiency, will tend to meet these 
measurable outputs and economise on 
the less tangible aspects of good care. 
But these are of the very essence of good 
care, which in nearly all cases needs 
to include the development of a warm 
relationship between care provider and 
recipient. Such things are hard to monitor 
and necessarily tend to fall by the wayside 
in the pursuit of market-led ‘efficiency’ 
(Gilbert, 2002; Stone, 2000). 
Second, this means that there are 
considerable costs to acquiring 
information about the quality of care. 
Providers in the private sector fail in their 
duty to shareholders if they do not take 
every opportunity to reduce costs. One 
way to do this is to lower costs in ways 
that do not show up in current monitoring 
procedures. Unless all aspects of quality 
can be monitored, the logic of the market 
leads to quality reduction in those aspects 
of quality that cannot. But these, as 
Economic theory and the 
logic of the market 
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we have seen, may constitute the very 
essence of good care. Providing better 
information to those who make purchasing 
decisions about the measurable aspects 
of care quality may only exacerbate this 
tendency for those aspects of care that 
cannot so easily be monitored. 
Similarly, information about prices in the 
absence of reliable information about 
quality, can lead to a pursuit of ‘value 
for money’ that becomes a race to the 
bottom in terms of quality. Monitoring 
standards need to be continually changed 
in an attempt to prevent this; not only is 
this process expensive, it will always run 
behind existing practice seeking for further 
ways to reduce costs - that, after all, is 
the argument for private provision being 
efficient. 
Third, there are also considerable costs 
in acting on the information that another 
supplier is providing a better service.  In 
care, continuity of provision is important, 
especially in residential care, where 
shifting from an unsatisfactory provider 
may mean a disorienting and even fatal 
change in both home environment and 
familiar carers. Not surprisingly, such 
changes are rarely made willingly. In such 
circumstances the transactions cost of 
change are too high to make market 
information useful.  Even with home helps, 
continuity is important in developing a 
warm and trusting relationship.  As the 
Hunt report showed, where that was 
possible in the past, home helps tended to 
work for the same clients for a long period. 
Two-fifths of home help recipients (three-
fifths in London) had had the same home 
help for at least a year (Hunt, 1970).
For consumer choice to promote high 
quality, consumers have to be able to 
change poor-quality providers for higher-
quality ones. Carers learn how to care for 
particular people (Waerness, 1987). This 
tacit knowledge takes time to acquire and 
cannot instantly be replaced by a carer 
offering better value for money. 
Fourth, there is evidence that if markets 
are to be sustainable, larger providers 
will become more dominant across all 
sectors of the care market. This is already 
the case in the residential and nursing-
care sectors which, as already discussed, 
have had much longer to develop 
than the domiciliary care sector. Large 
providers such as the Swiss company 
USI Group are consolidating their portfolio 
of nursing and residential care homes. 
As the Commission of the Social Care 
Inspectorate (CSCI) noted “A care market 
of fewer, larger providers presents a 
challenge to, or in some cases removes, 
the power councils have as the major 
purchaser in local residential care markets. 
This has largely positive implications for 
the market…but largely negative ones 
for choice” (CSCI, 2005, p.80) Evidence 
from France and other countries with a 
more established market in domiciliary 
care suggests that greater concentration 
is likely to occur as this market develops in 
England too.
The commission noted that this might 
explain why the fees paid by councils 
in many areas had increased sharply in 
recent years. Meanwhile more elderly 
people who want to live in a local and or 
smaller home have less choice, because 
in order to take advantage of economies 
of scale large providers tend to run larger 
homes (ibid. p.184). It also means that 
those requiring specialist provision, for 
example, those with special disabilities 
needs or dementia, will have increasing 
difficulty in finding a home which suits 
them. These same trends were observed 
in the US private market in the 1980s 
(Walker, 1995).
Finally, choice is in practice always 
constrained by rules and the 
interpretations of needs by others. For 
example, a person qualifying for local 
authority support can insist on being 
supported at home, but cannot choose 
to go into residential care sooner 
than their social worker decides it is 
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necessary, because that would cost the 
local authority more, unless they were 
owner occupiers. While many studies 
demonstrate that most older people 
want to live at home as long as possible, 
the consultation exercise conducted by 
the Department of Health in preparation 
for the white paper on health and social 
care revealed some who would prefer 
residential care to living in increasing 
isolation and apprehension in their own 
homes, even if they could still ‘manage’ on 
their own (Department of Health, 2006). 
Residential care should remain available 
as a positive choice. Further, purchasers 
who are not direct consumers do not 
necessarily have the care recipients’ direct 
experience of the quality of care being 
received. This is particularly problematic if 
the care recipient has difficulty articulating 
their needs, as some older people or 
people with learning disabilities may have. 
The more dependent they are before 
entering residential care, the more likely 
their capacity to choose is reduced.
There are therefore a number of reasons 
why a market for care does not reliably 
guarantee choice, and in so far as it 
brings about value for money, savings 
may be at the expense of the essential 
characteristics of good care. Regulation 
too may produce perverse incentives. In 
other words, there are inherent reasons 
why even regulated market provision 
is likely to deliver poor quality care. 
Gordon Brown recognised this when 
he questioned the desirability of treating 
health care provision as a commodity to 
be left to the market: “The many market 
failures in health care, if taken individually, 
challenge the adequacy of markets to 
provide efficient market solutions” (Brown, 
2004, p25). The same applies to social 
care.
The labour market and the cost 
of care
Economic theory can also help make 
sense of current tendencies in the labour 
market in which there is an increasing 
shortage of care workers.  The most 
appealing solution to the shortage of 
care workers might be to raise their 
productivity. Such a process could 
raise the pay and conditions of care 
workers at the same time as reducing 
the amount that adult care would cost. 
Public spending could be reduced or 
could be used to finance improved quality. 
However, it is hard to raise the productivity 
of care, because the need to develop a 
relationship with clients sets a limit on how 
many people can be cared for at the same 
time, or how many home-care visits can 
be made in a day, without reducing the 
quality of care provided. After a certain 
point, and that point has certainly been 
reached when home visits can be as 
short as 15 minutes, spreading care over 
more people becomes synonymous with 
reducing quality. In care, as in education, 
the measure of high productivity, a high 
client-to-carer ratio, is specifically taken as 
an index of low quality.
The care workforce does, however, need 
to be paid wages comparable with those 
in other occupations if recruitment and 
retention problems are not to overwhelm 
the sector. For a given wage level, total 
wage costs are inversely related to 
productivity. So, the wage bill will rise 
faster in social care than in industries 
where productivity can rise and wage 
costs per unit produced consequently 
fall. This is not caused by inefficiency in 
care provision, nor by rising standards or 
increasing numbers of people needing 
care, but is inherent in the relational nature 
of care. The current shortage of workers 
is a direct result of funding not keeping up 
with that reality.
If funding is sufficient, labour market 
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processes can be successful in providing 
jobs and allocating suitable people to 
those jobs in a sustainable way, providing 
the following conditions hold:
•	 employers reward high-quality 
work, by providing opportunities for 
advancement
•	 employers can impose contracts 
that ensure that they can recoup the 
costs of training, and/or workers or 
individuals have the incentive and 
means to pay for their own training 
•	 the labour market is competitive i.e. 
individual employers do not dominate 
a local labour market and workers 
have a range of potential employers 
who meet their needs in terms of 
hours, allocation and skill requirements
•	 workers’ motivation is simply 
determined by the pay that they 
receive (perhaps raised or lowered to 
compensate for particularly unpleasant 
or pleasant work) rather than doing 
a good job; market processes may 
be inefficient if they crowd out other 
intrinsic motivations .
Again these conditions are problematic in 
the case of care. As we have seen, there 
is little gain to acquiring training in care 
and little career structure. Employers are 
reluctant to train workers they cannot 
retain. Private-sector employers, in 
particular, won’t pay to train workers in 
skills that they can take from one employer 
to another. Although some employers put 
clauses in contracts requiring repayment 
of training costs if employees leave within 
a year, it is not clear if these requirements 
are enforceable (Baxter et al, 2008).  
Few care workers therefore, in contrast to 
nurses or social workers, have access to 
employer funds to pay for their training or 
public funds, especially if they are over 25 
years of age. (Given that only a minority 
of care workers enter employment in 
social care in their twenties the age limit 
is important. Only Scotland has raised the 
age limit from 25 to 50 years in the new 
social care traineeeship scheme). The 
logic of the market is that workers need to 
pay for their own training, and recoup the 
cost in higher wages. But this is unrealistic 
given the low wages that carer workers 
earn, and the limited opportunities that 
training brings to earn more.
Wages tend to be low and opportunities 
for advancement are limited because 
workers lack mobility. Many care 
workers are women with their own family 
responsibilities that limit their hours of 
work and the distance they can go to 
find it. At the same time, local authorities 
have tended to place social contracts for 
care on a locality basis, further limiting 
the choice of employers for such workers 
(ibid).  
Finally, a care worker’s motivation can be 
the key to the quality of work she does. 
Given the impossibility of monitoring the 
quality of all aspects of good care, the 
most reliable source of quality is for carers 
to have an intrinsic motivation to provide 
good care. As Hunt found in 1970, few 
care workers see the rewards that they 
get from their work as purely monetary. In 
the right circumstances, as we have seen, 
motivation can arise out of professional 
pride, notions of public service and/or 
emotional connection. These may be more 
difficult to harness for the private-for-profit 
sector than the not-for-profit and public 
sectors, with whose missions of public or 
charitable service, rather than maximising 
the profits of shareholders might more 
easily identify.
However, even in these sectors, where 
there is too much pressure on workers 
or they feel controlled in such a way that 
they cannot use their own professional 
judgement, intrinsic motivation can easily 
be crowded out. This can also happen 
through too hierarchical an extrinsic 
reward structure, particularly one which 
appears to restrict rather than enhance 
the autonomy of carers (Ungerson, 
2004; Stone, 2000). For example, home 
carers’ ability to respond sensitively to 
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their clients’ needs has been diminished 
through being given a prescribed list 
of tasks to be done and recorded and 
through reductions in some cases to as 
little as 15 minutes, in the time they can 
spend with a client (the care package). 
When home care was in the public sector, 
carers were never well paid but they could 
take pride in their work and most enjoyed 
a good relationship with their clients, 
knowing that what they did for them was 
needed and valued. As we have seen, 
turnover rates were low and many did far 
more than they were paid to do (Hunt, 
1968; Sinclair et al, 1990; Social Services 
Inspectorate, 2002). 
Knijn (2000) found a similar picture of 
reduced motivation among home carers 
in the Netherlands, following increasing 
dependence on the private-for-profit 
sector. In pursuit of cost savings, by 
destroying the job satisfaction and 
generous professionalism of a group 
of workers that came from developing 
relationships with their clients, turnover 
rates may have increased, thus 
undermining those savings as well as 
the quality of care. Again Gordon Brown 
recognised this problem for the health 
service: “…even if that task of regulation 
could be practically accomplished, public 
provision is likely to achieve more at less 
cost to efficiency and without putting at 
risks the gains from the ethic of public 
service where, at its best, dedicated public 
servants put duty, obligation and service 
before profit or personal cost” (ibid, p 26).
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The current personalisation agenda is 
based on recognition of some of these 
problems; in particular a recognition of 
the distortions that arise from the interests 
and knowledge of a local authority, as a 
purchaser of care, being different from 
those of the care recipient. It is recognised 
that using the expertise of the care 
recipients themselves in planning and 
purchasing their own care, could lead 
to better targeted expenditure, meeting 
needs better at lower cost. The growing 
demand over the past 15 years for direct 
payments in place of services has in part 
been fuelled by the failure of both local 
authorities and the private sector to rise 
fully to the challenges of the reforms 
of the early 1990s and deliver a home-
care service that fits people’s needs, 
expectations and their understanding of 
the meaning of good care. The current 
reforms look likely to address some of 
these concerns, but may exacerbate 
others.
However, the need for reform also stems 
from governments’ continued treatment 
of social care as an under-funded residual 
service. In recognition of this, the latest 
green paper (2009) on social care in 
England explores alternative methods 
of funding including various insurance 
schemes. However, whether these will be 
sufficient to  provide adequate funding 
remains to be seen, since the possibility of 
using general taxation to fully fund a basic 
social care system for all has already been 
ruled out “…because it places a heavy 
burden on people of working age” (green 
paper, 2009, p18).
Personalisation
Direct payments are payments from 
public funds to people with care needs 
in order that they can purchase their own 
care services on the market, either from 
private or voluntary sector providers, 
or by employing their own personal 
assistants directly. They immediately 
overcome the problem that the purchaser 
and the consumer of care services 
could have divergent experience and 
interests by making sure they are the 
same person. In the UK means-tested 
direct payments were first introduced in 
1997, partly in response to the demands 
of the independent living movement and 
the disability movement for people with 
disabilities to be enabled to arrange and 
purchase the services they needed for 
themselves, rather than relying on what 
their local authority was willing and able to 
provide or commission. 
Challenging the idea that the need for 
assistance in daily life renders a disabled 
person ‘dependent’, the disability 
movement argued that:
 “independence is achieved by having 
choice and control over the assistance 
they require; and that this choice and 
control is essential to enabling people 
who need support to access their 
human and civil rights” 
(Morris in Glendinning and Kemp, 
2006, p 237). 
While supportive of direct payments, 
Morris challenges the view that the 
notion of ‘choice’ necessarily undermines 
the development of public services, 
even though it is consistent with the 
New Labour government’s emphasis 
on consumers rather than citizens. To 
Morris not only choice but also control is 
necessary to achieve self-determination:
 “…it is not an impairment in itself 
which restricts what someone can 
do but the lack of choice and control 
over the required assistance. This 
is not about consumerism, or the 
application of market forces to 
undermine public services; instead it 
is about fundamental rights to self-
determination that, if denied, prevent 
certain groups of people from being 
fully part of society” 
(Morris, p245). 
Government responses
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Direct payments are only for purchasing 
services on the market and cannot be 
used to obtain a local authority service. It 
is now recognised that this might not suit 
all people needing care. In England an 
alternative to taking a direct payment is 
a personal budget that allows the person 
needing care to choose for themselves 
which services to use and who will provide 
them. However, the personal budget 
leaves all or part of the responsibility to 
commission those services with the local 
authority. In theory therefore, a personal 
budget would be a better choice for those 
who do not want the responsibility of 
managing a direct payment, particularly 
if this involves becoming an employer of 
a personal assistant. However, the real 
choice of using a service provided directly 
by the local authority may no longer exist. 
In England, many local authorities have 
outsourced all their home-care services, 
for example. 
An individual budget is more flexible in 
theory than a personal budget because 
it combines resources from different 
funding streams including local authority 
social care. The other components could 
come from the Independent Living Fund, 
integrated community equipment services, 
disabled facilities grants, supporting 
people for housing-related support 
and access to work. The individual-
budget holder can get some support in 
commissioning the services they want but 
may have to pay for this support
The IBSEN study, which evaluated 
individual budgets as they were piloted 
in 13 local authorities in 2006-07, found 
that the majority of recipients of individual 
budgets took them in the form of a direct 
payment (Glendinning et al, 2008 p57). In 
addition many used the money to employ 
a personal assistant. This is not surprising 
because:
•	 older people are much less likely 
than younger people to be eligible 
for support from these other funding 
sources
•	 managing different funding streams 
can be complicated and time 
consuming if expenditure from 
each one has to be accounted 
for separately. In practice, for 
administrative and legal reasons, they 
cannot always be amalgamated to pay 
for a single service because there are 
restrictions on the use to which certain 
benefits can be put 
•	 some forms of provision may not 
be viable at all. For example, local 
authorities and voluntary organisations 
may no longer be able to provide day 
centres if numbers making use of 
them fall (Sense, 2008, Glendinning et 
al, 2008) 
•	 in theory direct-payment or individual-
budget holders might provide a 
market for an enterprising provider of 
day-centre services, but there are very 
few commercially run day centres. The 
history of market generation in this 
area is poor, not only in the UK (see 
above) but also in other countries. 
The barrier to entry of the minimum 
number of clients to make provision 
viable may simply be insurmountable, 
given low profit margins in many 
areas.  In the case of childcare, in 
many areas provision needed start-up 
grants to make it viable and even then 
there was considerable churn when 
start-up grants ran out
•	 by devolving budgets to individual 
service users who have much less 
market power than a local authority, 
the potential for cost savings is 
reduced (Glendinning et al, 2008 
p206).
Direct payments, personal budgets 
and individual budgets all form part 
of a government agenda to introduce 
personalisation in social-care services. 
Along with a rejection of “one-size-fits-
all” policies for public services more 
generally, this agenda is based on the 
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belief that many previous problems in 
social care can be overcome by enabling 
people to engage more actively in the 
construction of the care services that 
they need. However there is continuity 
in its approach too, in that another 
of the UK governments’ objectives in 
introducing direct payments has been to 
extend the market in care services. Thus 
the government asserted in relation to 
England, without evidence, in the green 
paper Independence, Wellbeing and 
Choice: our vision for the future of social 
care for adults in England, published in 
2005:
 “the ability of people to ‘buy’ elements 
of their care or support packages will 
stimulate the social care market to 
provide the services people actually 
want, and help shift resources away 
from services which do not meet needs 
and expectations” (p35). 
It remains to be seen whether the 
opportunity to take up direct payments will 
be enough to create a sustainable market 
that provides the personal assistants and 
the specific services that these payment 
holders will require. The minimum number 
of clients required to make services viable 
provides a barrier to entry which low profit 
margins may not be able to overcome. 
Evidence from the UK and abroad 
discussed later in this report suggests that 
this might be the case.
The idea behind personalisation is 
more in keeping with the notion of the 
‘active citizen’, it assumes that those 
needing care will be empowered to 
‘co-produce’ the support they need. In 
other words they have become partners 
with those who provide support and 
services. “Self-directed services work 
because they mobilise a democratic 
intelligence; the ideas, know how and 
energy of thousands of people to devise 
solutions rather than relying on a few 
policy makers” (idem). This chimes with 
the emphasis on individual responsibility 
and active citizenship found in so many 
policy documents in recent years. These 
descriptions of those in need of and using 
publicly funded services and support in 
future are contrasted with previous older 
generations who ‘passively’ accepted 
what the state offered them. 
This perspective however fails to recognise 
that the meaning of ‘independence’ 
changes over time as people get older 
and more aware of their ‘interdependence’ 
(Audit Commission, 2004). Many older 
people who have been active, contributing 
citizens for all their adult lives, not least in 
bringing up the next generation of citizens 
and workers, now feel it is the turn of the 
younger generation to provide the support 
they now need because of growing 
frailty. As a woman in her eighties living in 
residential home explained to researchers 
in an earlier study:
“The best thing is the lack of 
responsibility. People don’t understand, 
you see. I nursed through two world 
wars, the general strike, the flu 
epidemic so I think I’m justified in 
wanting a little respite.” 
(cited in Sinclair 1988, p265)
This is not to say that older people, even 
if they do not wish to organise their own 
care, do not wish to be listened to and 
treated with dignity and respect.
Personalisation is described by the 
Department of Health as meaning that 
“every person who receives support, 
whether provided by statutory services or 
funded by themselves, will have the choice 
and control over the shape of that support 
in all care settings” (‘Expert guide to 
personalisation’, Community Care, 13 July 
2009). This approach therefore underpins 
not only the use of direct payments, but 
also individual or personal budgets, user-
led services and self-directed support. 
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Further, “self-assessment will also be a 
cornerstone of personalisation. Giving 
service users the opportunity to assess 
their own care and support needs and 
decide how their individual budgets are 
spent are central parts of the agenda” 
(idem). Although self-assessment is 
currently widely viewed as “a misleading 
term” according to the Commission of the 
Social Care Inspectorate, (CSCI, 2009, 
p139) entailing intensive support from 
care managers, it marks a different way 
of thinking from that behind the shift that 
occurred in 1993 when assessment of the 
need for social care and other services 
was placed firmly in the hands of social 
workers. Self assessment means that 
social workers are now required to behave 
more like brokers than managers of care. 
The most successful use of direct 
payments occurs when the person 
receiving them has a condition which is 
stable over long periods. With the Health 
and Social Care Act 2008 extending 
the availability of these payments to 
people lacking the capacity to consent, 
not all service users will be capable of 
determining what they want and some 
will not have the autonomy they might 
wish for. Social workers have to assess 
the risk of a direct payment user misusing 
their budget or being abused. In addition, 
for any direct payment user the need for 
a different arrangement may occur when 
their health deteriorates and they are 
least able to make new arrangements. 
Older people are more likely than some 
younger people with physical disabilities 
to experience reducing capacities over 
time. This reduction can sometimes 
happen suddenly and unexpectedly as a 
result of a fall for example. They need a 
system which can re-assess their needs 
very promptly. Local authorities retain a 
duty of care for those they support and 
are therefore responsible for making 
alternative arrangements when they are 
interrupted or break down, or needs 
suddenly change. This responsibility is 
not always made clear to direct payment 
recipients.
Restraining public expenditure
Even the keenest advocates of 
personalisation recognise that in the face 
of a government’s determination to limit 
growth in, or cut, public expenditure, 
choices may be too restricted to achieve 
their aims (Morris, p248). The level of 
funding remains an issue with direct 
payments and other ways of extending 
choice, such as personal and individual 
budgets. However, it is clear that making 
spending more cost-effective is part of the 
motivation behind personalisation.
In introducing direct payments, the UK 
government was influenced by evidence 
presented to it in the mid-1990s that 
direct payments were not only what 
disabled people wanted but they were 
more cost-effective (see Yeandle and 
Steill, 2007). Personalisation will be more 
cost-effective because “…people who 
participate in creating solutions that meet 
their needs make public money work 
harder and help deliver public policy 
goals” (Leadbeater et al, 2008, p81). 
Indeed, there is evidence that many direct 
payment recipients use the money frugally 
and imaginatively. They may even spend 
less than they have been given and often 
less than the local authority would have 
done if they had provided the home care 
themselves (interview, Scotland). There is 
also evidence from Scotland that some 
local authorities have clawed back any 
underspend even when recipients have 
been keeping it for emergencies (Scottish 
Personal Assistant Employer’s Network, 
2009, p1).
The government announced in autumn 
2009 that by 2011 every English 
local authority would have a user-led 
organisation directly contributing to 
the development of personal budgets 
and, amongst other things, supporting 
personal budget and direct payment 
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holders and their carers. (‘Personalisation; 
councils given benchmarks on progress’, 
Community Care, 10 Sept 2009). This is 
a welcome development, for in the early 
years in England there were no additional 
funds to develop personalisation in general 
or support direct payment holders in 
particular by providing on-going support 
for them in their new role as employers. 
Indeed initially there was an expectation 
that the switch to direct payments would 
lead to reductions in local authority 
expenditure because local authorities 
would cut back on the infrastructure which 
had supported the direct employment and 
training of home carers. Responsibilities 
for good employment practices and their 
costs were passed to direct payment 
holders, providing a source of saving to all 
local authorities. 
In 2006 the Audit Commission 
commissioned research in 11 local 
authorities to establish under what 
conditions, if any, direct payments saved 
local authorities money. The key variables 
identified were:
•	 the hourly rate on which the direct 
payment was based 
•	 the number of direct payments in 
payment
•	 the costs of training local authority 
social services staff and the time they 
subsequently spent on providing 
advice and guidance to direct 
payment holders.
There were very large variations between 
local authorities, with one paying direct 
payment at half the local authority hourly 
rate and another at 50% more. Lower 
rates, which were more common than 
the same or higher rates, were explained 
on the grounds that “direct payment 
customers are purchasing from a different 
segment of the market (for example, 
friends, families and neighbours)” (Frontier 
Economics, 2006, p59). 
It is clear from this research that in order 
to make savings local authorities are under 
considerable pressure to base the amount 
paid on a lower rate than they would pay 
for in-house or agency home carers. A 
study by Janet Leece conducted a little 
later than the NAO study cited above, 
found that personal assistants were 
typically paid £5.16 an hour compared 
with £6.14 an hour for home-care staff. 
When unpaid overtime was taken into 
account one personal assistant in her 
study was being paid less than £3 an hour 
(Mickel, 2009).
There were also very large variations in 
the amount spent on managing direct 
payments, ranging from £200 to £1,800 
per direct payment holder. There was 
some discussion in the Audit Commission 
report of the need to train social workers 
in their new role of offering help to direct 
payment holders, and to reduce their 
resistance to introducing direct payments, 
especially to older people. However, there 
was no consideration given to the support 
that a personal assistant might need in the 
form of advice or training.
Pressure on local authorities to increase 
the uptake of direct payments is also 
becoming greater. In 2006 only 7% of 
recipients of social care were direct 
payment holders. By 2011, the Care 
Quality Commission will be measuring 
local authorities’ performance against a 
target of having 30% of service users on a 
personal budget.
The extent to which direct payments are 
‘cost-effective’ therefore depends on 
what basis the comparisons with publicly 
provided services are made. If the basis is 
too narrow, the potential for and efficacy 
of direct payments in containing the 
costs of social care will be exaggerated 
and the transaction costs, which fall on 
the direct payment holder themselves 
and their carers, including their personal 
assistants (discussed below)  are at best 
minimised and at worst ignored. So far 
in many authorities in England, but less 
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so in Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
these transaction costs have been largely 
overlooked. As direct payments are 
rolled out more widely, the willingness of 
holders and their personal assistants to 
absorb these costs can be expected to 
fall.  Those who have chosen to be the 
early movers into this system are likely to 
be those most dissatisfied with previous 
provision and/or those with particular 
ideas as to how to use their payments 
differently.  These are likely to be those 
for whom the transaction costs of direct 
payments are least; those who are most 
willing to absorb those costs; and those 
who have relatives and friends to help 
them manage their payments.
Problems with cost 
containment
Payments for care have been seen as a 
way of restraining the growing costs of 
long-term care. This is for two reasons: 
not providing unnecessary services 
and spending less on those that are 
purchased, in practice achievable only 
by employing less well remunerated staff.  
While the first is wholly desirable, the 
savings may be one-off. Once budgets 
are spent more efficiently to meet needs, 
further savings will not be forthcoming, 
but the pressure to restrain costs through 
rising unit costs will not diminish. Saving 
on wage costs may result in poorer quality 
care if it is simply a way of shifting the cost 
of high quality care from the local authority 
to the care worker through underpayment. 
Again this may also just be a one-off 
saving. Opening up the labour market 
to carers who had not previously taken 
employment will expand the available pool 
of labour and thus may restrain the need 
to raise wages, which would otherwise 
be unavoidable. However, once this new 
pool of labour is absorbed, and especially 
if personal assistants develop some form 
of organisation to represent their claims 
and needs, the same pressures on costs 
will re-emerge. So while direct payments 
might provide one-off savings they do 
not provide any long-term restraint on the 
rising costs of care.
Further they may add to costs. This is 
for three reasons. The transaction costs 
of the myriad of small contracts that the 
relationships between direct payment 
holders and their personal assistants 
entails are inevitably more costly than 
block contracts with a few providers. 
These costs may be shifted to the direct 
payment holders but they are real costs, 
so unless holders are compensated 
for these, this is just a way of making 
care recipients manage on less. These 
transaction costs and the consequent 
diseconomies of scale are large, especially 
if conditions are to be regulated to meet 
at least minimum standards and security 
checks are to be properly carried out. 
This may be one reason why the voluntary 
registration of home-care workers has 
been postponed to 2011, and the 
registration of personal assistants is still to 
be discussed and consulted upon.
Other increased costs through the loss 
of economies of scale may be even more 
serious, such as those associated with 
providing training and back-up cover for 
emergencies. It is not surprising if direct 
payment holders are not prepared to 
pay for training their personal assistants 
if they are not funded to do so and are 
given no support with finding replacement 
carers while training takes place (see 
Table 3 below). These provisions can be 
made collectively even when employment 
contracts are individual; however, the 
ethos of individual choice that lies behind 
personalisation may work against that.  
Second, those who do not want to employ 
personal assistants but wish to spend 
their payments purchasing care from a 
provider may find costs rising as providers 
lose the advantages of economies of 
scale. Already some providers are talking 
about dropping out of the market or 
having to raise charges if they cannot rely 
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on the number of clients in a given area 
that a local authority contract would have 
provided (Yeandle et al, 2006, interview 
with UK Homecare Association).  
Finally some forms of provisions may 
not be viable at all.  For example, local 
authorities and voluntary organisations 
may no longer be able to provide day 
centres if numbers making use of them 
fall (Sense, 2008). In Northumberland 
for example in the teeth of a strong local 
campaign by unions and service users, 
the council decided to close seven day 
care centres citing under-use linked to 
the introduction of personal budgets. 
The move to personal budgets has also 
been cited by Norfolk County Council 
and many others as reason to close day 
centres – despite strong opposition from 
the people who use them.  In theory 
direct payment holders might provide 
a market for an enterprising provider of 
day centre services, but there are very 
few commercially run day centres. The 
history of market generation in this area 
is poor, not only in the UK (see above) 
but also in other countries. The barrier to 
entry of the minimum number of clients 
to make provision viable may be just 
insurmountable, given low profit margins 
in many areas.  In the case of childcare, 
in many areas provision needed start-up 
grants to make it viable and even then 
there was considerable churn when start-
up grants ran out.
The very process of trying to restrain 
spending also has deleterious effects. 
As has been seen in recent years, 
restricted spending tends to get 
concentrated on meeting measurable 
targets, making the notion of self-
assessment highly problematic. Pressure 
to meet measureable targets inevitably 
has a tendency to squeeze out other 
aims, including the willingness to trust 
workers to provide a service governed 
by professional norms and individual 
experience. But these are of the essence 
of good care. Such pressures also tend to 
crowd out spending on the ‘extras‘ such 
as training and lead, as argued above, 
to the passing on of ‘invisible’ costs to 
individual care recipients or their carers. 
From the point view of the government, 
the cost of cash payments is much easier 
to contain than the cost of services, 
especially those in the public sector 
where there is an organised and vocal 
workforce. Not letting cash payments rise 
in line with costs when those in receipt of 
them are isolated care recipients, many 
of them employing their previous informal 
carers, is a relatively easy way to restrain 
spending. In Germany in 2001, three-
quarters of domiciliary care users took the 
option of a cash payment even though 
it was worth half the value of services 
in kind (Glendinning and Kemp, 2006, 
p 236). Many used it to pay an informal 
carer. There is now evidence that more are 
changing back to opt for the service not 
least because the cash payment has not 
been increased since it was introduced 
(Glendinning and Moran, 2009).  
To counteract such easy ways to reduce 
costs at the expense of care recipients 
themselves it is important that assessment 
of their needs and their costing is carried 
out by a different body than the one that 
will pay the costs. It is also important that 
needs assessment is done on a ‘carer- 
blind’ basis (disregarding the presence of 
an informal carer). This is not mentioned in 
the green paper. The proposed limitation 
on the provision of free personal care to 
those without a carer in receipt of local 
authority support is disappointing.
The role of informal carers
Some more recent changes in the UK 
government’s policy towards informal 
carers need to be seen in this light. As well 
as introducing measures to enable them 
to combine paid employment with caring, 
such as in 2006 extending to informal 
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carers the right to request to work flexibly, 
it now allows direct payments to be used 
to employ them, including in exceptional 
circumstances, co-resident relatives. 
Although the IBSEN study conducted in 
2006-07 reported resistance in some local 
authorities towards using direct payments 
to pay relatives, this marks a major shift in 
policy towards recognising and paying for 
care provided within the family (Ungerson, 
2004). England, in particular, had been out 
of step with the rest of Europe in refusing 
to use public money to pay relatives for 
childcare or the care of frail or disabled 
adults throughout the whole of the last 
century. This rapid policy change is not 
only a response to the significant numbers 
of direct payment recipients who choose 
to employ their informal carers, even if 
an alternative is available, and of informal 
carers who wish to be able to combine 
employment with caring, but also a 
realisation that if pressure on budgets is 
not to become intolerable, policy makers 
need to consider how best to sustain 
informal care. 
“The sheer size of informal care 
provision within families and local 
communities make it essential for all 
countries to consider how support for 
informal care can best be targeted and 
if alternatives such as non-financial 
support give more value for money for 
the persons receiving and giving care.” 
(Lundsgaard, 2005, p39) 
Sweden has extensive formal adult care 
services and the state is regarded as the 
provider of first rather than last resort. 
Nevertheless, even there it has been 
estimated that the volume of unpaid 
informal care is twice as large as the 
volume of formal care (idem).
There is evidence that paying informal 
carers is cost-effective. First they typically 
do a great deal more than they are paid 
to do. This has long been acknowledged 
elsewhere in Europe. For example, in 
Norway family carers were employed (and 
had the same employment rights) as part 
of the municipal home help service in the 
1970s and were regarded as very good 
value for money. Family carers (and other 
personal assistants) can still be employed 
by the municipalities in Norway. Second, 
the NAO (2006) noted that it was easier 
to pay family and other informal carers a 
lower rate. The IBSEN study estimated 
that when carers were involved either 
directly with a payment or benefiting 
indirectly from the services provided for 
the individual budget holder, “the average 
value of funding through individual budgets 
for the service users whose carers took 
part in the study was £270 (median £170) 
compared with the costs of conventional 
service packages of £390 (median £350) 
in the comparison group” (Glendinning 
et al 2009, p58). This is based on small 
figures so must be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless they are indicative of the 
difference a carer can make.  
While families and friends are often 
keen to provide some informal care, it 
is important that the demands made on 
informal carers are not excessive. There 
is growing evidence that without support, 
carers’ health suffers (Lundsgaard, 2005). 
A review of the evidence for the Wanless 
committee concluded that: “Those groups 
most likely to suffer ill-health as a result 
of their caring responsibilities receive 
least support, whereas those who are 
particularly at risk of a negative impact 
from long hours of care, that is those who 
care for the longest periods, are least 
likely to be able to access health care 
when needed” (Wanless, 2006, Annex 
11, p38). The health of 72% of carers 
over the age of 50 is adversely affected 
compared with 40% of younger carers” 
(ibid, p37). Adequate support for informal 
carers can be regarded as a preventative 
health, and therefore budgetary, measure. 
In the UK, carers have recently won the 
right to respite care funded by primary 
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care trusts (although the system does 
not always mesh well with local authority 
social care because of the long standing 
and continuing problems of co-ordination 
between health and social care discussed 
above) (Glendinning et al, 2009, chapter 
14).
Finally, economic activity rates of older 
women have increased in Britain to 
over 70% compared with 56% in 
1971 (Population Trends, Sept 2009).
The cohorts of women entering their 
fifties since 2007 are those who 
benefited from the post-war expansion 
of first, educational and subsequently 
employment, opportunities for women. 
Their experience and expectations of 
employment are very different from those 
of their mothers and it is government 
policy to increase these participation rates 
still further to 80% as well as to raise 
the pension age. At the same time their 
parents are surviving longer into old age 
so government employment and social 
policies must take seriously that many 
are combining employment with (often 
substantial) caring responsibilities. They 
may also be providing essential child care 
for their grandchildren. Currently 40% 
of mothers in paid employment rely at 
least in part on informal (most commonly 
grandmothers) childcare. In these 
circumstances, denying direct payment 
holders the opportunity to employ a 
relative if this is what all concerned 
consider the most appropriate choice, 
makes little sense. Moreover the formal 
services needed to replace some of this 
informal care do not exist in many areas. 
This is no doubt one of the main reasons 
for excluding carers, in contrast to lone 
mothers, from the obligation to prepare for 
and to take up, paid employment in the 
current welfare to work reforms.
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Personalisation on the 
ground: direct payment 
holders and their personal 
assistants
“Across government there are examples of policies 
accidentally placing workers at risk in vulnerable employment, 
for example through the introduction of direct payments 
without sufficient support for social care service users to 
undertake their responsibilities as employers.” 
(TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment, 2009, p35)
Personal assistants, those employed 
directly by direct payments, are some of 
the most isolated workers in the UK. If 
personalisation is successful in its aims, 
their number is set to grow. It is therefore 
important to consider the employment 
relationship in which they and direct 
payment holders engage to see what 
implications this has for: 
•	 the conditions of employment of 
personal assistants
•	 their working relationship with their 
employers
•	 any problem that direct payment 
holders have in being employers
•	 the boundaries of employer 
responsibility.
Conditions of employment: 
some problems for personal 
assistants
Many personal assistants are traversing 
the boundary between the informal 
and formal care sectors. On one hand, 
many work very short hours. A study for 
Skills for Care by IFF, was based on the 
experience of over 500 direct payment 
users and personal assistants drawn from 
16 local authorities in England in 2007, 
found nearly two-fifths were working 
under eight hours a week (IFF and Skills 
for Care, 2008). Of those working very 
short hours, half were continuing to work 
alongside a job in the formal social care 
sector. Altogether, a quarter of all personal 
assistants were combining this work with 
another job in this sector. On the other 
hand, resident personal assistants may 
find themselves on-call 24 hours. This 
group includes significant numbers of 
migrant workers, who will be discussed in 
more detail below.
Evidence from the TUC’s Commission on 
Vulnerable Employment (2008), the Low 
Pay Commission, 2009, reports from 
Citizens’ Advice Bureaux and various 
research studies of care workers in general 
and personal assistants in particular 
(Leece 2008, Skills for Care and IFF, 2008) 
including migrant workers (Cangiano et 
al, 2009), shows that personal assistants 
may be vulnerable in a number of ways, 
through:
•	 having an unclear employment status 
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because of working very short hours, 
living-in or being wrongly defined as 
self–employed. All may result in loss of 
pay, benefits and other employment 
rights
•	 lacking job security or guarantee of 
work
•	 the level of direct payment or individual 
budget being insufficient to meet the 
needs of the care receiver
•	 ignorance of, and lack of clarity about, 
their rights. This ignorance is shared 
by their employer in the absence of a 
contract
•	 lack of knowledge about, or access to, 
advice and support if the relationship 
becomes difficult
•	 lack of training opportunities, including 
health and safety matters
•	 agency workers being open to 
exploitation, although the UK 
government’s recent signing up to the 
EU directive on agency workers may 
offer some protection.
In theory all direct payment holders 
should be given sufficient money to 
pay their personal assistant at least the 
minimum wage. However, in its latest 
report the Low Pay Commission recorded 
evidence that local authority payments 
to providers of social care in general had 
not kept pace with increases in minimum 
wages and other costs, thus adding 
to the pressure to keep down wages. 
The commission recommended that 
local authority commissioning policies 
should reflect the actual costs of care 
(Low Pay Commission, 2009, para 3.38). 
Inadequate funding of direct payments in 
the context of lack of clarity concerning 
the inclusion of tax and the payment of 
national insurance contributions, holiday 
and sick pay, the costs of emergency 
cover (for example if the personal assistant 
falls sick) and the rights of a personal 
assistant to paid maternity or sick leave, 
leaves personal assistants particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation. Further, wage 
rates for overnight or live-in support where 
the application of minimum wage rates is 
not straightforward could be contentious 
and - in the case of migrant domestic-care 
workers - a cause of considerable anxiety 
(Gordolan and Lalani, 2009).
Some direct payment holders avoid some 
of the responsibilities of being an employer 
by employing personal assistants for a 
small number of hours, so that they fall 
below the national insurance level (eight 
hours in the UK). This is possible if the 
direct payment holder has a low level 
of need or is prepared to pay several 
personal assistants each for very short 
hours. The Personal Social Services 
Research Unit (PSSRU) research on direct 
payments found evidence of this practice, 
particularly among older people (Davey 
et al, 2007, p62). The advantage of not 
paying national insurance contributions 
is that the personal assistant can then 
be paid pay a higher hourly rate, but it 
may have deleterious effects on their 
entitlements to benefits in the future, 
particularly pension entitlements. Other 
personal assistants may define themselves 
as ‘self-employed’ (or find themselves 
so defined) without fully understanding 
the negative consequences in relation 
to tax and social insurance and their 
employment rights (see Gordolan and 
Lalani, 2009 and TUC Commission on 
Vulnerable Employment, 2009) 
The views and interests of some personal 
assistants can conflict in other ways with 
those of their employer. In particular the 
Skills for Care study showed that there 
were differences in views concerning 
the importance of a written contract 
of employment, taking up references 
or a CRB check (a third of employers 
in the study had not done so) and the 
advantages of being included in the 
voluntary registration of social care 
workers. The view that there was no need 
for a formal contract was more common 
among direct payment recipients than 
among their personal assistants, although 
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there were some assistants who did not 
want to formalise a relationship based 
on friendship either: “The man I have no 
contract with I am friends with him as well 
as being a carer for him so therefore a 
contract would get in the way” (IFF and 
Skills for Care, 2008 p63).
The lack of a contract, however, could 
in practice be a problem for assistants. 
They need clarity about their pay and 
employment rights and also to reduce 
the possibility of conflict when working 
alongside other informal carers or 
members of the family who have different 
views about the tasks they could be 
expected to do (Gordolan and Lalani 
2009, Scottish Personal Assistance 
Employers Network, 2009). When 
differences cannot readily be resolved, 
personal assistants need access to 
professional support which is often not 
forthcoming. A personal assistant’s need 
for access to training cannot easily be met 
within an informal relationship, particularly 
in the absence of funds. Relationships 
which become abusive are particularly 
difficult to handle, especially when the 
personal assistant is a migrant care 
worker, isolated from family and friends 
who could give them advice and support 
(Gordolan and Lalani, 2009).
A significant proportion of personal 
assistants have already been caring for the 
direct payment holder either as an informal 
carer (a third) or employed by an agency 
(a fifth). As well as those receiving direct 
payments, an estimated 145,000 older 
people were employing and funding their 
own personal care in 2006 (PSSRU, 2006 
p46). In that sense the employer/employee 
relationship between someone needing 
care and their personal assistant is not a 
completely new one. What is new is that it 
is being funded by the state.
Working relationships
There have been a number of research 
studies on the experience of direct 
payment/individual budget holders who 
are employing personal assistants. The 
Skills for Care study is one of the largest 
to be published so date. Like all studies so 
far, its sample is of early movers into the 
personalisation system, so is likely to over-
represent those who were dissatisfied with 
their previous care. But in this study, like in 
all previous, smaller studies, the majority 
of the personal assistants and their 
employers were found to be very satisfied 
with the arrangements for a number of 
different reasons. It is therefore worth 
quoting some of the findings at length.
Many direct payment holders reported that 
they had time to develop a relationship 
with their personal assistant, who would 
be reliable and flexible in their work, 
and many contrasted this with previous 
experiences with care workers arranged 
by the local authority (although often 
provided by private-sector care providers) 
who were under much greater time 
pressure:
“My carers are marvellous, more like 
a friend than doing a job, more like a 
friend or neighbour attitude. My cleaner 
does extra jobs that were not done 
before. The personal assistants do 
certain tasks that they would not do in 
regular hours.” 
(Quoted in IFF and Skills for Care, 2008 
p44)
“It means I get the same people all of 
the time and I can build up more of 
a trusting relationship rather than not 
know who is coming through the door.” 
(Quoted in IFF and Skills for Care, 
2008, p44)
“The advantages were that we weren’t 
waiting for a home help who wasn’t 
coming - for a start. (Or who) when 
they came, said: ‘I can’t stop, because 
I’ve got somebody to go to’.”  (Yeandle 
and Steill, 2007, p127)
“There’s a very big difference between 
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somebody who is with you five hours a 
day and somebody who is with you 20 
minutes or something like that.” 
(Idem)
Many personal assistants also found the 
relationship with their employers more 
rewarding than their previous experiences 
in the social care sector:
  
“It’s good fun and the hours are 
suitable. The agency I was working 
for beforehand wanted me to do extra 
hours and I couldn’t as I have disabled 
children.” 
(Quoted in IFF and Skills for Care, 
2008, p79)
“Employed as a personal assistant 
I had only one person to please; 
employed in a care home I had lots of 
people to keep happy.” 
(L Tidder, 2006, p141)
There were advantages to direct payment 
holders in being able to set limits on what 
they needed to ask family carers to do 
because someone else was available, and 
in being able to value at least some of the 
help given by family carers by being able 
to pay for it. Payment reduced their sense 
of dependency on a family carer and 
acknowledged the value of the task. The 
ability to reciprocate reduced their sense 
of dependence:
“It has stopped me having to rely 
on my Mum and Dad. I can ask my 
personal assistant to do things I would 
not like asking my parents to do.” 
(Quoted in IFF and Skills for Care, p44)
“It makes me happier that someone is 
now getting paid to do the jobs, like 
showering me. I think it is good that 
someone should get paid to do it.”
(Quoted in IFF and Skills for Care, 2008 
p44)
On the other hand, it was clear that setting 
limits on what the personal assistant could 
be expected to do within a relationship 
defined as ‘friendship’ was complicated. 
As Ungerson (2004) found in her research 
this was often mentioned, especially if the 
carer was living in; because carers felt 
responsible they often then did more than 
they were paid to do:
“I can form more of a personal 
relationship with my carer where I 
would not feel daunted by asking about 
personal matters because I have got 
to know them in a more personal way. 
I can now ask my personal assistant to 
assist me with anything, and would not 
feel embarrassed to do so.” 
(Skills for Care and IFF p43)
 
“You become quite close to them 
because they trust you and you trust 
them. I would say you almost become 
like friends really, on the whole I think 
you don’t want to let them down.” 
(Quoted in Yeandle and Steill 2007 
p130)
However this carer found that although 
she was doing more and more for her 
client, the agency wouldn’t pay any extra. 
“Say you fell ill or your children were 
ill. If they (personal assistant) are your 
friend then they will help you even if it is 
not their time to be at work.”
(Direct payment user quoted by Leece 
, 2008) 
“But if you’ve got a cold here you can’t 
let Gemma down, you don’t want to 
come you don’t want to give her a cold 
but what alternative have you got.” 
(Personal assistant quoted by Leece, 
2008)
“[The personal assistant] gives more 
friendship time in care than paid 
care time which is wonderful for me 
obviously because to be selfish I 
couldn’t manage without him but I’m 
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not sure it is good for him.”
(Direct payments user quoted in Leece, 
2006, p196)
This is in contrast to a home care worker 
who was able to place limits on friendship.
“I’m not her friend friend. I’m her friend 
but only so far.” 
(Quoted in Leece, 2006, p198)
While some personal assistants did not 
miss working with colleagues and enjoyed 
the freedom of not being answerable to 
a manager, there were others who found 
the job emotionally draining. Working with 
very vulnerable people can be extremely 
demanding:
“What I hate the most about the job 
is having to sit and watch someone in 
agony 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
because even though I can’t feel the 
pain, believe it or not mentally it is just 
as bad.” 
(Personal assistant quoted in Leece, 
2008) 
Had she been working as part of an local 
authority home care department or one of 
the better home care providers described, 
for example, in Yeandle et al’s study of 
local domiciliary care markets (Yeandle et 
al, 2006), she would have had colleagues 
to talk to and a manager who could 
advise and support her. Moreover, more 
demanding clients can be shared with 
other workers and individual home carers 
have a mix of clients, some with very 
complex and others with simpler needs. 
Some personal assistants who had given 
up work with a home-care agency in 
order to become a personal assistant 
found that not only was the pay not as 
good as it seemed at first, but that they 
had underestimated the importance of 
support from colleagues. Crossroads, 
a homecare provider in the voluntary 
sector, for example, is concerned that the 
lack of professional support for personal 
assistants may add to the sector’s 
difficulties in improving overall recruitment 
and retention rates. Some personal 
assistants request to be allowed to return 
to their previous employer (Baxter et al, 
2008).  Providers do not welcome their 
workers being ‘poached’ or tempted away 
by (seemingly) higher wages, even if some 
eventually want to return, for it destabilises 
their workforce. Attempts to reduce this by 
adding penalty clauses in their contracts 
have little effect because they are difficult 
to enforce. 
Problems for direct payment 
holders employing personal 
assistants 
More personal assistants than direct 
payment recipients saw their relationship 
as a straightforward employer/employee 
relationship. This is not surprising. After 
all many direct payment recipients had 
chosen someone already known to them 
or someone whose recommendation they 
could trust. They felt they already knew 
enough about their personal assistant’s 
background. In practice, this could cause 
problems.
Like the personal assistants themselves, 
a majority of those employing personal 
assistants reported that overall they were 
satisfied with the arrangements. However 
two in five direct payment holders in the 
Skills for Care and IFF study expressed 
some dissatisfaction, particularly with their 
role as an employer. These concerned: 
•	 difficulties in finding personal 
assistants 
•	 formalities involved in establishing 
and maintaining the employment 
relationship 
•	 the burden of managing a payroll
•	 concern about the management and 
resolution of disputes  
•	 uncertainties about how to handle 
matters when the relationship broke 
down 
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•	 practical worries about cover 
in emergencies or change of 
circumstances 
•	 financial concern about the levels 
of pay that could be afforded out of 
direct payments 
•	 how to pay for holidays and other 
entitlements. 
Direct payment holders have the option 
of using an agency to find or provide a 
personal assistant, so some of these 
difficulties could be reduced or avoided. 
In addition to assistance finding a 
personal assistant they are likely to get a 
replacement assistant more quickly in an 
emergency. However, agencies charge an 
administration fee of 10% to 15% of the 
holder’s budget. This reduces the amount 
out of which the personal assistant’s 
wages are paid.
The paperwork involved in setting up 
and maintaining the formal requirements 
of being an employer can be very 
burdensome. Even those with previous 
experience of handling accounts do 
not necessarily want to continue doing 
so into their eighties. The IBSEN study 
(Glendinning et al 2009) found some 
carers had given up work in order to 
manage the budget of a relative who 
was a direct payment or personal 
budget holder. On the other hand other 
studies have found some enterprising - 
and younger - direct payment holders, 
having learned the ropes, were providing 
a service to other direct payment or 
personal budget holders (see section 3 in 
Leece and Bornat, 2006). 
These financial concerns are but 
one aspect of the problems of self-
assessment discussed earlier.  In general 
there is a lack of clarity about how levels 
of direct payments are determined, 
and a belief that the points system 
(or resource allocation system – RAS) 
for particular levels of disability, or for 
older people, does not translate into 
a fair formula that reflects the needs 
of different groups and the costs of 
meeting those needs appropriately. This 
view has been expressed, not only by 
direct payment holders themselves, 
but also organisations, such as Age 
Concern, those concerned with disability 
rights and, in particular, organisations 
representing people with specific 
disabilities, such as Sense, which works 
for and with adults and children who are 
deaf and blind.
The boundaries of employer 
responsibility: policy and 
practice across the UK
The difficulties arising from the 
employment relationship between givers 
and receivers of care described above are 
common to all payment for care schemes. 
There are, however, interesting practices 
and policies within the UK, which can 
reduce the vulnerability of personal 
assistants to poor working practices at 
the same time as protecting the quality of 
care given. These experiences show that it 
is possible to balance better the interests 
of both the direct payment holder and the 
personal assistant, thereby increasing the 
sustainability of the personalisation project. 
Conversely there is clear evidence that 
lack of effective oversight and regulation 
can lead to exploitation of either or both 
parties as well as showing that ‘cost-
effectiveness’ is achieved at the expense 
of personal assistants and the quality of 
care they can provide. 
As Table 2 below shows, the introduction 
of direct payments in the rest of the 
UK has been far more cautious than in 
England, in part perhaps because of 
a greater ideological resistance to the 
marketisation of social care (Pearson, 
2006), as well as a wish to develop 
policies independently of England.  Other 
forms of personalisation are also far 
less developed in general in other parts 
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of the UK, with Scotland developing a 
very different set of polices around the 
provision of free personal care and Wales 
not yet prepared to introduce personal 
budgets. England is the only country in the 
UK to have introduced personal budgets.
Table 2  
Distribution of recipients of 
direct payments across the UK 
in Spring 2008
Country 2002-03 2008
England 7,882 55,900
Scotland 292 2,500
Wales 185 2,000
Northern Ireland 49 1,100
Source: Pearson, 2006 p38 and Cangiano,2009 p14
Scotland has considerably more 
autonomy than the rest of the UK over 
the development of local social care 
policies. The demise of public sector 
direct provision of care is not envisaged 
there, as it seems to be in England. 
In addition in Scotland the voluntary 
and local authority sectors still provide 
most domiciliary and residential care 
services (Scottish Care Commission 
2008). UNISON is more involved in the 
development of policies and practice 
through its partnership with the Scottish 
Personal Assistance Employers Network 
(SPAEN). In contrast, the focus in 
England has been more on involving 
‘users’ and less on including personal 
assistants and other social care workers 
who provide the hands-on care. 
Indeed, paid hands-on care workers are 
conspicuous by their absence in many 
of the English policy discussions about 
structures and systems for supporting 
the development of direct payments, 
personal budgets and individual budgets
In Northern Ireland, there are few 
private home care agencies although, 
when residential care is included, the 
private sector now accounts for most 
social care provision. The Department 
of Health, Social Services and Public 
Safety combines health and social care 
responsibilities which reduces some of 
the competition over budgets and shifting 
boundaries between health and social 
care. The trusts provide some basic 
training for personal assistants concerning 
lifting and the use of equipment such 
as hoists. The administration is keen to 
improve access to training (Department of 
Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 
2007). 
As Table 3 below shows, practice with 
respect to costs covered by a direct 
payment varies across the UK, as well 
as within England. The uncertainty about 
what personal assistants are entitled 
to is reduced in Northern Ireland by 
providing a payroll service to all direct 
payment holders, including drawing up 
a contract. The trusts also pays for and 
arranges employers’ indemnity insurance 
and CRB checks. In addition every new 
direct payment holder is introduced to an 
existing one and/or to an appropriate user 
group. The Centre for Independent Living, 
which is independent of government, 
also plays an important part in the 
development of policy and practice as 
well as being a source of information for 
direct payment holders. Personal budgets 
have not yet been introduced in Northern 
Ireland. The use of informal carers is 
widespread but if an agency is wanted 
the local trust will approach them directly. 
Direct payment recipients may require an 
extra payment to meet an unanticipated 
need; only in Northern Ireland are these 
extra payments always available either on 
an ad hoc or periodic basis. In contrast a 
quarter of Scottish and a fifth of English 
local authorities never make payments of 
this kind (Davey et al PSSRU, 2007, p63).
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Table 3  
Items included in the direct payments hourly rate of local 
authorities/trusts in the UK by country
Country No of 
LAs/
Trusts
Tax NI Hol 
pay
Sick 
pay
Contingency 
funds
Start-
up 
costs
Support 
costs
other
% % % % % % % %
England 110 88 96 86 78 46 19 25 24
N.Ireland 3 100 100 100 67 0 0 0 0
Scotland 8 50 100 100 75 75 13  13 25
Wales 3 67 67 67 67 1 0 0 0
Source: Davey et al PSSRU, 2007, p63
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Experience and lessons 
from Europe and 
elsewhere
Cost containment in other 
countries
Cost containment is a key driver of social 
care policies across many industrialised 
countries because in the light of 
demographic, social and political trends 
and rising unit costs for care, significantly 
increased budgets look unavoidable. It has 
been estimated on the basis of a study 
of 19 OECD countries in 2000 that even 
countries currently spending between 
2.5% and 3% of GDP on social care 
provision that this percentage will have to 
double by 2050 just to maintain current 
service standards - let alone improve 
current standards or extend availability to 
more of those needing care (OECD, 2005, 
p39). Expenditure on social care for adults 
in the UK, at 1% of GDP, was close to the 
average for the countries studied (ibid.
p26 Figure 1.1). In many OECD countries, 
including the UK, there is widespread 
dissatisfaction with current standards and 
with only those with the highest levels of 
need receiving care services. Better quality 
care and reaching all those with significant 
needs would require higher staffing levels 
and training standards (OECD health 
project, 2005, p13) which would add 
further to costs.
Large variations across countries in 
public expenditure on care do not reflect 
demographic or social structures in a 
simple way. In other words they are not 
driven entirely by the growing numbers 
of old (and very old) people or people 
with disabilities, compared with those of 
working age. They also reflect; 
•	 political choices about where and how 
to draw the line between public and 
private responsibility
•	 the level of women’s employment 
affecting, in one direction, the amount 
of time people in employment can 
devote to the care of others and, in 
the opposite direction, the financial 
resources families and governments 
have available to spend on care. By 
taking up paid employment, women 
on the one hand become taxpayers in 
their own right as well as contributors 
to social insurance systems, but 
on the other hand their availability 
to provide care for their families is 
reduced
•	 the extent to which it is possible to 
combine care with paid employment. 
This varies between countries. 
Comparative studies show that the 
economic activity rates of older 
women are positively correlated with 
the level of provision of formal care 
services
•	 explicit government strategies to 
alter the division between men and 
women of the responsibility for the 
care of younger and older generations. 
These have developed unevenly, with 
Scandinavian countries recognising 
the need for such strategies earlier 
and more fully
•	 the poor image of care work. The cost 
of care services is too often presented 
as a ‘burden’ and employment in 
this sector poorly paid, menial and 
monotonous (European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, 2006). The power 
of this image depends in turn on the 
rights associated with citizenship and 
understanding of intergenerational 
solidarity.
The form of public support for social care 
has also been changing across Europe as 
well as in other industrialised countries. In 
some countries, particularly in southern 
Europe, formal care services are under-
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developed and state provision of social 
care services is widely regarded as a last 
resort. Cash payments have been seen as 
a way of sustaining family responsibilities 
for care. In other countries, such as 
Germany and even in some municipalities 
in Sweden, existing provision of publicly 
funded services is being curtailed or 
replaced by cash paid to those needing 
care and systems of direct payments have 
been developed. While there is a common 
aim to increase ‘choice’ and ‘flexibility’ in 
long-term care services, one of the key 
objectives of these policies has also been 
to curb the growing costs to the public 
purse of social care 
The place of care workers in the 
labour market
In some European countries the problems 
involved in becoming an employer are 
avoided or at least reduced, because the 
direct payment holder is not the employer. 
Instead the chosen personal assistant 
becomes an employee of the municipal 
authority as in the case of Finland and 
Norway. They enjoy the same benefits as 
other municipal employees and can join 
their pension scheme. 
In Norway direct payment recipients can 
now choose  a voluntary organisation 
representing people with disabilities 
(ALABO) to become their chosen personal 
assistant’s employer.  Those needing 
care have none of the responsibilities of 
being an employer. In the Netherlands, 
from the outset of the scheme in the 
1990s, the national Social Insurance 
Board became the personal assistant’s 
employer. Direct payment holders can 
still make this arrangement but with the 
growth of home-care agencies, direct 
payment holders have the choice of either 
paying an agency to provide a personal 
assistant or arranging for their chosen 
personal assistant to be employed by an 
agency(Glendinning and Moran, 2009). 
In France, as will be discussed in more 
detail below, the use of non-profit home 
care agencies is the most common 
arrangement. Here, 55% of direct 
payment recipients who need home care 
pay a carer employed by such an agency 
and a further third use an agency to recruit 
a care worker and in many cases get help 
with the administrative responsibilities of 
being an employer (Martin and Le Bilan, 
2007, p46). This means that nine out of 
ten direct payment recipients have access 
to assistance with recruitment and finding 
a temporary or permanent replacement 
when their needs change.
In some countries there are organisations 
which assist mainly with recruitment. 
Some provide training as well. One 
example, operating across Europe is the 
international Caritas federation based 
in Freiberg, Germany. Caritas provides 
some training in social care and acts as a 
recruitment agency in a number of Eastern 
European countries, offering a placement 
service for those seeking domestic 
care workers, not only in Germany but 
also in Italy and Austria, where there 
is no regulation over the use of direct 
payments. In Vienna Caritas may also act 
as an employer of a personal assistant 
including a relative, but its main activities 
are focussed on helping those needing 
a personal assistant to find one and vice 
versa. In Romania the national Caritas also 
provides training - not only for those who 
are planning to migrate to become care 
workers but also on-the-job training for 
care workers it employs itself (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions, 2006, p30 and 
p47). 
In other countries, notably those of 
southern Europe, there is growing 
evidence that many personal assistants 
and migrant domestic workers are 
operating on the fringes of the labour 
market where little is done to protect their 
rights and needs or increase the visibility 
of these workers. Recent experience in 
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Italy, where formal social care services are 
undeveloped, especially in the south, and 
direct payments have been widely used 
for 20 years, is instructive. There, there is 
no oversight of the ‘companion payment’ 
introduced in the 1980s for disabled and 
older people needing constant care, which 
is funded from general taxation and is not 
means-tested. In 2003 well over a million 
people were receiving it. Immigrants are 
often employed, many as live-in carers 
where, even if they are legal, they can be 
paid below the minimum wage and can 
be instantly dismissed. When in 2002 
there was an amnesty for undocumented 
migrants, there were 340,000 applications 
for regularising a foreign domestic worker. 
It was estimated that half of home helps 
and domestic workers were migrants 
(Theobald et al, 2007). While some 
arrangements work well and last over 
several years, the tensions arising from 
this relationship, especially for live-in 
carers, can lead to exploitation (Ungerson, 
2007). 
Experience in the US also shows that little 
or no regulation may result in the state 
funded expansion of a ‘grey economy’ of 
care and domestic workers with heavy 
dependence on immigrant workers. 
Following the welfare-to-work reforms 
starting in the late 1990s, such as the 
introduction of temporary assistance for 
needy families, which requires labour force 
participation as a condition of income 
support, lone mothers have provided 
another vulnerable source of such workers 
(Gilbert, 2002 Keigher, 2007).
Expanding the boundaries of 
the formal labour market 
In contrast to ignoring a growing grey 
market, national employment policies in 
France have been based on the objective 
of expanding the boundaries of the formal 
labour market. Since 1990 there have 
been tax incentives in the form of paying 
the employer’s pension contribution 
for those paying their informal carer or 
domestic helper the minimum wage and 
paid holidays. These measures legalised 
previously informal jobs and by 1996 over 
three-quarters of a million households, 
compared with half a million in 1990, were 
employing a domestic worker on a formal 
basis. However these jobs often remained 
casual and vulnerable (Martin and Le 
Bihan, p 41, 2007). 
In 1997 a form of direct payment, the 
Prestation Specifique Dependence (PSD) 
was introduced on a means-tested basis 
to those over the age of 60 living at home 
or in residential care and assessed on a 
national dependency scale as being very 
dependent. The responsibility for agreeing 
a care package, in consultation with the 
older person and their family, rested with 
the local authority. It could be used to 
employ a relative (except a spouse) or 
a home carer either recruited from, or 
directly employed by, a home-care agency. 
If the agency was non-profit making they 
could be entitled to social security and 
tax exemptions. Nearly 70% of the hours 
paid for out of the PSD scheme were 
accounted for by personal assistants 
recruited through the agencies, which 
might also deal with the administrative 
arrangements concerning recruitment 
and the payment of the worker (ibid, p43) 
The exclusion of those with moderate 
assessed  needs and income, together 
with recovery of the cost from the old 
person’s estate (this had always been the 
case for Aide Sociale, the local means-
tested assistance scheme), meant the 
scheme was not very popular and fell 
short of expectations. It was also criticised 
because it created new unskilled and 
casual jobs and the personal assistants 
experienced problems arising from lack 
of ongoing support similar to those 
experienced by personal assistants in 
England (described above).  
In 2002 the PSD was replaced by the 
Allocation Personnalisée a L’Autonomie 
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(APA), which included those who were 
less dependent, abolished recovery from 
inheritance and guaranteed access to 
the same services across the country - 
care plans that gave rights to a specified 
amount of money according to level 
of dependency. This was guaranteed 
by the state which made good any 
shortfall in the resources of individual 
local authorities, who were responsible 
for implementing the negotiated care 
plans. At the same time a co-payment 
element was introduced whereby above a 
certain income threshold the older person 
contributed to the funding of the care plan 
in proportion to his or her income. Initially 
it was funded from the social insurance 
system together with an agreed proportion 
of funds from local authorities.
The introduction of the APA was a 
success, rapidly increasing the numbers 
of claimants. However, with a shift to the 
right among local and central government, 
cuts were made in the spring of 2003, 
reducing the proportion of recipients 
exempt from making any contribution 
from 67% to 36% (ibid, p45). The heat 
wave of the summer of 2003, in which 
15,000 elderly people died in hospitals, 
residential homes or in their own homes, 
resulted in a rethink. The government and 
administrative authorities were blamed 
for their lack of preparation for such an 
event. The minister of health was not 
re-elected and, among other measures, 
the government guaranteed funding for 
APA for frail older people. In particular, 
a new fund was established based on 
an increased employers’ contribution of 
0.3% of their payroll balanced by a 0.1% 
increase on the Contribution Sociale 
Generalisee paid by employees and the 
abolition of a one-day public holiday. 
However, there is no social partnership 
(gestion paritaire) between the government 
and the trade unions and other 
professional organisations; unlike in other 
parts of the social security system where 
trade unions have equal membership of 
the boards managing the particular social 
security fund and developing policy. The 
management of this negotiated bargain 
between employers and wage earners 
therefore may not be as firmly based as in 
other branches of the contributory social 
security system as a whole (Martin and Le 
Bilan, p54). 
Nevertheless, overall Martin and Le Bilan 
concluded: “with the APA, the French 
cash-for-care system is no longer an 
assistance policy, reserved for the poorest 
and more dependent, but a more universal 
scheme, open to all people in need of 
support because of their dependency” 
(op.cit p54). It is an interesting illustration 
of what can be achieved when the welfare 
of the older generation is taken seriously, 
albeit as the result of a disaster. Solidarity 
between the generations has more 
salience in France. Good quality collective 
child-care services have been taken 
seriously for decades, not only to facilitate 
the employment of mothers, but also 
because children as citizens are entitled to 
such care in their own right.
In this context, the training and 
professional development of care workers 
was taken seriously. In 1996 a two-
tiered approval system for agencies had 
been introduced. Approval granted by 
the Regional Prefet meant that agencies 
providing care services for older or 
disabled people (or childminding services) 
have to conform to certain standards of 
funding and staffing at either a ‘basic’ or 
‘quality’ level. There was also a national 
diploma for home helps but only a small 
proportion held it (9% in 1999). In 2002, 
a national qualification was introduced 
arising “from the political desire to raise 
the quality and qualification of this work, 
alongside the implementation of the APA” 
(ibid, p47). It requires nearly twice as 
much time as the previous diploma: 500 
hours of theoretical learning, 560 hours of 
practical training and 17 hours of personal 
tuition, and can be taken on a full-time or 
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part-time basis. In her recent comparative 
study of care workers, Ungerson found 
that a large number of agency-employed 
social-care workers in France hold this 
diploma as well as being trained in health 
and safety matters (Ungerson, 2006). 
The downside of these reforms are that 
agency workers have a number of clients 
and often feel rushed and under pressure 
to limit their care to a fixed set of tasks. 
They could not always practice the holistic 
approach they had been taught, although 
they did work with the same clients over a 
period of time. 
Agency workers in France have regulated 
and scheduled hours. There is no long-
hours culture and the EU Working Time 
Directive is taken seriously. By establishing 
maximum hours of work it has not only 
been possible to reduce the opportunities 
to exploit agency workers but it can also 
be used to limit ‘on-call’ duties. In France, 
care workers must be remunerated for 
the hours during which they are on call 
including during the night, these hours, 
called “heures de presence responsible’, 
must be paid at a rate not less than two-
thirds of the standard wage (Gordolan and 
Lalani, 2009 p24). 
Building on common interests 
and the role of trade unions
Support for establishing and maintaining 
good employment practices is to the 
benefit of both the direct payment holder 
and the personal assistant, since the 
quality of care delivered depends on 
good relationships and care workers’ 
motivation. However, some direct payment 
holders and a smaller number of personal 
assistants, as already discussed, worry 
that more formal contracts will interfere 
with the very relationship that they wish to 
establish. This tension - which Knijn and 
others have called the different logics or 
rationalities of care which come into play 
when care is brought into the workplace 
(Knijn 2004) - cannot be wished away. 
However the parties concerned can be 
helped to manage it. 
There have been some very interesting 
attempts to create organisations which 
involve both personal assistants and those 
using direct payments to employ them. 
One is the success in Los Angeles county 
of the SEIU, a nationwide union in the US, 
which in 1999 represented 1.4 million low 
and moderately paid workers in building 
services, health care and public services. 
At the time it was devoting 40% of its 
resources to organising new workers such 
as home-care workers, who were doing 
very similar work to home carers in the 
UK. 
The union wanted to follow care work 
into community-based settings where the 
workforce had doubled between 1990 and 
2000. In doing so, it had to overcome:
•	 the lack of a common workplace
•	 the absence of a clear chain of 
employment responsibilities between 
home-care providers, those using their 
care and the county, state and federal 
government
•	 the existence of a third party in the 
employment relationship, namely 
frail older people and those with 
disabilities, who wanted to control 
how personal care work is organised 
in their homes, for all the reasons 
described above. 
Based on their common interests, the 
union managed to create a long-term 
alliance between care workers and those 
to whom they provide care, which had 
as its purpose to secure and maintain 
security for both parties.
SEIU’s first attempt to gain union 
recognition to represent home-based care 
workers was to argue that LA county was 
their shared employer because it was 
the source of 90% of the money which 
paid their wages and its representatives 
determined the number of hours and 
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rates of pay. The courts rejected these 
arguments on the grounds that LA 
county was only administering a state 
programme1. 
After strenuous lobbying the union won 
the right to enrol members and collect 
dues on a voluntary basis. On this basis, 
they developed services such as a 
registry of home-care workers to assist 
recruitment and increase the public profile 
of home carers. They subsequently won 
the right to become a public authority 
which could act as an ‘employer of record’ 
for home-care workers, although those 
employing care workers in their own 
homes retained the right to hire, fire and 
supervise their assistant, thus removing 
some of the concerns of the disability 
activists. This organisation could then 
bargain on behalf of both care workers 
and the care recipients. They fought a 
common campaign for more public funds 
to have the costs of employing a personal 
assistant recognised as well as for higher 
wage rates. “Key to the success at both 
state and local levels was the mobilisation 
of workers and consumers (direct 
payment recipients) and the emergence 
of one voice that linked worker and 
consumer issues and identified solutions 
that enhanced the position of both within 
the in-house supportive services system” 
(Walsh, 2001, p 232). Thus, though the 
union gave up some rights to defend 
individual home carers, they won the right 
to represent home carers collectively. As 
a result, access to training as well as to 
better pay has improved. 
1 A case concerning a personal assistant, which 
UNISON took in South Lanarkshire in very different 
circumstances involving sexual abuse, attempted to 
prove the local authority was the employer but it too 
was lost (see Pearson, 2006). 
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Issues arising
Family support
In common with experience in other 
countries, it is younger and physically 
disabled adults who have been the most 
interested in and willing to manage their 
own care (Lundsgaard, 2005, p32). Given 
their active participation in advocating this 
policy, it is not surprising that in the UK 
they were the first in 1997 to receive direct 
payments. The scheme was subsequently 
extended to older people and then to 
carers, to parents of disabled children and 
to 16 and 17 year olds with disabilities. 
They are no longer confined to those with 
long-term needs.  
However “many of the success stories 
in using personal budgets featured new 
patterns of support often developed with 
the help of exceptional caring families and 
of visionary and committed staff” (CSCI, 
2009, 130). As the parent of a deaf-blind 
child said: “I think the government is 
exploiting vulnerable parents and calling 
it empowering. It is actually exhausting” 
(Sense, 2008, p 17). In practice, in these 
cases the transaction costs of setting and 
monitoring care packages are being taken 
up by families and friends rather than 
the local authority. It is unlikely that these 
levels of family support will be available for 
the newer groups of direct payment and 
personal budget holders.  
The employment of relatives
Direct payments were slow to develop 
even in England, compared with other 
European countries, where similar forms of 
cash-for-care schemes were introduced in 
the 1990s.  This may in part be because 
they, like individual budgets, were initially 
only available to pay relatives in very 
restricted circumstances, since relatives 
were expected to provide care services 
unpaid. So the restriction was partly 
imposed to save the government the 
dead-weight cost of paying someone for 
a service they would anyway provide for 
free (not recognising that this was the not 
a real saving but simply a transfer of that 
cost from the government to the carer). 
The restriction was also imposed from a 
fear that, despite evidence to the contrary 
from other countries, paying relatives 
would undercut the basis on which family 
care was provided and lead to its decline. 
The final reason for imposing, until very 
recently, the restriction on employing 
relatives was that, unlike in other European 
countries, one of the UK government’s 
initial aims in the development of direct 
payments was to stimulate a market of 
domiciliary care services.
Few other European countries have 
imposed such restrictions on the 
employment of close or co-resident 
relatives and those that still do, often 
only restrict the employment of spouses. 
(Lundesgard, 2005; Glendinning and 
Moran, 2009). However, the elaborate 
restrictions in England (see Ungerson, 
2004) on employing relatives using direct 
payments and individual budgets are 
now being reduced because in many 
circumstances relatives are the only 
people available. Research on local 
domiciliary care markets has shown that 
they are not (yet) well prepared to meet 
the needs of individual direct payment 
holders (Baxter et al, 2008; Yeandle et al, 
2006). In rural areas and small towns the 
‘market’ barely exists. That this is still a 
problem in many countries where direct 
payments were introduced much earlier 
and home-care agencies are larger than 
in the UK, suggests that alternatives to 
the market will continue to be necessary 
even in a more ‘mature’ home care market 
(Glendinning and Moran, 2009). It is also 
clear that those wanting to employ a 
personal assistant are uncertain about 
how to find one in the marketplace. 
Indeed they do not know how to locate 
the market (ibid). Although as already 
discussed the employment of carers in 
Italy and Austria is largely unregulated, the 
organisation Caritas plays an important 
part in putting care workers and those 
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needing care in touch with each other.
The restrictions on employing relatives 
have also been relaxed because, in line 
with the emphasis on personalisation, 
direct payment recipients’ choice to 
employ who they want has come to 
supersede the aim of developing a market 
in social services. Many (nearly half in the 
largest study so far conducted of direct 
payment recipients discussed above) 
choose to pay a relative or friend, not least 
because they want someone they know 
and can trust (IFF, Skills for Care, 2008). 
This is their choice and is not surprising as 
experience from other countries shows:
 “... in a very direct way, the option to 
have a relative or friend as carer (and 
vice versa to provide care for a relative 
or friend) can be seen as a central 
element of choice and flexibility in long 
term care-provided that both parties 
consent”. 
(Lundesgard,2005, p4)
Older people
The government wants direct payments 
to be used more widely, so local 
authorities approached by those needing 
domiciliary care are now required to 
offer a direct payment before offering 
to arrange a service. As Table 4 below 
shows, the result has been a substantial 
increase in the numbers taking up direct 
payments, particularly among older 
people, although this is still only 2% of 
the 650,000 older people eligible for 
direct payments. In autumn 2009 the 
target for the numbers of people on 
personal budgets in 2011 was set at 
30%. It remains to be seen how many of 
these will be direct payment holders.
Table 4: Adults and older people receiving direct payments in England 2001- 07
Administrative category 2001 2007
Adults 18-64 4, 274 16,140
Older people 65+ 537 13,184
Carers (for carers services) 21 7,728
Adults 18-64 with learning disabilities 353 6,587
Adults 18-64 with mental health issues 61 2,086
Adults 18-64 with sensory impairment 100 1,126
HIV/AIDS n/a 197
Drug and alcohol abuse n/a 41
Total 5,346 47,088
Skills for Care annual workforce report 2008 p 23
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Personalisation, whether it takes the form 
of a direct payment, personal budget or 
individual budget, poses challenges for 
social service departments in general, 
and social workers in particular. The tasks 
involved in implementing personalisation 
involve assessment, planning, putting 
plans in place and ongoing management. 
Although self-assessment is an important 
part of the process, some groups needing 
care require a considerable amount of 
help. Older people are more likely to 
need more support than other groups 
(Glendinning et al, 2008, p238) so the 
demand on local authorities is likely to 
increase.
Because older people are more 
recent recipients of direct payments, 
their experiences have yet to be fully 
represented in many studies so far 
published. In any case, the studies which 
have been published to date include 
mainly those who have actively chosen 
direct payments. There is some evidence 
from the pilot studies that older people 
are more reluctant to have an individual 
budget, especially if it entails becoming 
an employer, and doing so increases their 
level of anxiety (Glendinning et al, 2009; 
Yeandle and Steill 2007). This result is 
consistent with findings from comparative 
research studies, not only in Europe but in 
the US and Canada. 
The dependence of the social-
care system on migrant workers
The success of personalisation depends 
on the availability of suitable carers. 
While some are content to employ 
a member of their family and that 
relative is happy to care on that basis, 
this is not an option for everyone. So 
far the labour market in social care 
has not worked well.  Constrained by 
government funding and care recipients’ 
own income, wages in the social care 
sector are among the lowest in the 
country with little career structure for 
staff. There are high turnover rates and 
continual vacancies. The employment 
of personal assistants may help with the 
latter, through bringing some informal 
carers, previously out of the labour 
market, into employment. However 
this ‘informalisation’ of care-sector 
employment, as we have seen, is 
likely to exacerbate its problems of 
low wages, training opportunities and 
absent career structure. This makes 
care work an unattractive occupation 
and dependent on recruiting those 
whose choice of employment is heavily 
constrained. In the past, as discussed 
above, single women were drawn into 
residential care work because it provided 
them with a roof over their heads  Today 
migrant workers choose care work for 
similar reasons or because fewer jobs 
are open to them, especially if they are 
combining work with studying. 
This is not an inevitable result of the 
introduction of personalisation. Ungerson 
found two major variants in the rules and 
regulatory framework which significantly 
determined the outcomes of cash-for-care 
schemes. One was whether or not the 
payment of relatives was permitted. The 
other was the regulatory framework for 
enforcing the social rights of care workers 
(Ungerson, 2004, p210). Ungerson and 
other researchers have found that where 
regulation is weak there is likely to be 
heavy reliance on migrant labour, often 
undocumented. 
In some parts of England, the expansion 
of the social-care workforce both in the 
residential and domiciliary care sectors, is 
already heavily dependent on migrants, as 
Table 5 shows. 
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Table 5 Percentage of the social-care workforce born outside the 
UK by country and region 2007
Country % social-care workforce born outside UK
England 19
London 68
South east 25
Most English regions 11-15
Northern Ireland 13
Scotland 2
Wales 4
United Kingdom 16  = 105,000 people
Source: Skills for Care 2008 based on the labour force survey
This is not a recent phenomenon. Migrant 
workers made a significant contribution to 
the development of the post-war British 
welfare state and to its health and welfare 
services in particular from the outset. 
Since the turn of this century they have 
been making a growing contribution to 
the social-care workforce. By 2008 nearly 
one in five social care workers were 
foreign born, compared with 8% in 1998. 
In addition, between 2003 and 2008, half 
the additional 155,000 workers who joined 
the social care workforce in England were 
foreign born. 
Not surprisingly, recent migrant care 
workers, those that arrived in the past 10 
years, have some different characteristics 
from longer established migrant or UK-
born care workers. In particular recent 
migrants tend to be younger, with the 
majority aged between 20 and 34 years; 
43% of earlier migrants are aged between 
50 and 64 years. Many are engaged in 
education, and of those working part-time 
50% are doing so to undertake training, 
75% for qualifications in the health or 
social care sector. Otherwise migrant 
workers are less likely to be working part-
time, only 25% compared with 50% of the 
UK-born social care workforce. Recent 
migrants are less likely to be employed 
in the public sector (5%) than either long 
established migrants (18%) or UK-born 
care workers (23%). They are also more 
likely to be men; men are nearly a third of 
recently arrived migrant care workers, but 
only 13% of UK-born care workers.
Table 6 Distribution of foreign-born social care workers by 
immigration status 2007-08
Status Percent
UK national 28
EU national 20
Indefinite leave to remain 14
Spouse 7
Student visa 9
Other visa category 2
Work permit holder 19
TOTAL 100
Source: COMPAS 2009 table 4.6 based on LFS data
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In some parts of England, the expansion 
of the social-care workforce, both in the 
residential and domiciliary care sectors, 
has become heavily dependent on 
migrants. Overall, the regional distribution 
of foreign-born care workers is similar to 
the distribution of the whole of the migrant 
population in the UK. However there are 
distinct distributional patterns between 
regions and within the social-care sector. 
Whereas Indians and Eastern Europeans 
are evenly spread across the regions, 
Africans and Caribbean people are more 
likely to be found in London, reflecting 
in part earlier flows of migrants. Social-
care workers from Zimbabwe and the 
Philippines also reflect the distribution of 
residential care establishments and are 
therefore found disproportionately in the 
south east and south of England. 
The government does not address the 
issue of migrant workers in the latest 
Department of Health’s paper Working to 
Put People First: The strategy for the adult 
social care workforce in England, (DH 
2009(b)). The document only discusses the 
need for a more diverse workforce, arising 
from earlier migrations. 
The shift to a points-based immigration 
system for those outside the EEA, poses 
challenges for the social-care sector. 
Social care is defined as low-skilled 
work and therefore the recruitment 
from overseas of only senior social-care 
workers with relevant qualifications and 
experience will be allowed. In addition 
such migrant workers must be paid 
an annual salary of at least £24,000. 
Providers are concerned that the 
government may well have underestimated 
the effect of the changed immigration 
rules on social care providers’ ability to 
recruit and retain the existing senior staff 
they still need (Canganio et al 2009)  New 
migrant workers from outside the EEA 
face additional problems for they have 
no access to publicly funded education, 
including even language courses, for the 
first three years and no recourse to public 
funds if they lose their job or a contract 
is terminated. They cannot get indefinite 
leave to remain until they have been in the 
UK for five years. This means they must 
rely entirely on their employers to give 
them even basic training opportunities. 
Those who employ domestic care 
workers are very unlikely to give them 
such opportunities either because they do 
not have the resources or because they 
are unwilling to give them the necessary 
time off (Gordono and Lalani, 2009). 
Perhaps the government is hoping that 
the recruitment subsidy for employers to 
take on 50,000 traineeships, together with 
plans to extend apprenticeships in social 
care to include personal assistant roles, 
will compensate for the loss to the sector 
of new immigrant care workers due to the 
points-based migration system. 
All this raises questions about the ways 
in which in this growing international 
labour market in care is spread across 
regions and nations and who bears the 
cost of such a system. By the UK taking 
only skilled workers it may fail to remedy 
shortages at more junior levels in the care 
sector. It will also unfairly benefit from 
training provided in other countries, while 
at the same time undermining efforts to 
produce a career structure within the 
sector, necessary to recruit and retain UK-
born care workers. 
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Policy recommendations
It is clear that personalisation has brought 
benefits to many who have taken up 
the opportunity to use direct payments, 
personal and individual budgets. It 
has also brought benefits, in terms of 
employment opportunities and working 
relationships, to many personal assistants. 
However, most experience so far is 
of those who have chosen to be early 
movers into this new system, who are 
more likely to be dissatisfied with the old 
system, and therefore more inclined to 
appreciate the benefits of the new.
If this system is to be rolled out more 
generally in a sustainable way there are 
some important issues that need to be 
resolved.
The issue of choice 
Personalisation is designed, among other 
benefits, to enhance care recipients’ 
choice of how they are cared for. Recent 
legislation recognises that not everyone 
may wish to exercise that choice by 
buying their own care services.
Burden of responsibility
Personal and individual budgets have 
been designed for those who wish to 
continue using social services at least in 
part, in particular those who do not want 
the responsibility of being an employer. 
However, this does not remove the 
responsibility of management of a budget 
and making decisions that some people, 
particularly older people may not want. 
It is important that the introduction of 
personal budgets and individual budgets 
is managed sensitively so that those who 
prefer to be provided with an established 
package of well-run services continue 
to be able to do so and do not have to 
take on what may be seen as a burden of 
choice. 
Threat to day centres
There is also the question of support for 
collective provision. By others exercising 
the choice of taking cash instead of a 
service, those who would prefer to use 
collectively provided care services such 
as a day centre will find such provision 
closing. As discussed above, this is 
already happening, and affects not only 
public-sector but also voluntary- sector 
provision. A recent study of 269 users 
of care services in four local authorities 
conducted by Demos with the Centre for 
Disability Research at Lancaster University, 
found that nearly a third would spend 
their money on a day centre if they had a 
personal budget (reported in Community 
Care). 
Limitations of individual payments
Individual pots of money are not easily 
used to fund such centres - or other 
community- based services (or even safe 
pavements). It is significant that at the 
same time as demanding direct payments 
the disability movement also campaigned 
successfully for public provision and 
regulation to make public buildings and 
amenities, as well as transport systems, 
accessible to people with disabilities. 
Direct payments cannot meet such 
systemic needs of older people or those 
with disabilities. 
Increased cost of services
If many people take up direct payments, 
some services directly provided or 
financed by local authorities may no 
longer be commercially viable on current 
funding. It needs to be recognised that 
the introduction of personalisation means 
that such services may become more 
expensive to run.  It is important that 
collective services that rely on economies 
of scale, such a day-care centres, 
continue to be available (and indeed 
are expanded and improved). Such 
collective forms of care bring benefits, 
including social contact that it is difficult 
or impossible for individuals to produce 
through spending individual budgets on 
their own. A specific budget needs to be 
set aside to provide them. Otherwise the 
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effect of personalisation will be to restrict 
the choices of those who wish to make 
use of such services, which are vital to 
overcoming the isolation in which many 
old people and some younger people with 
disabilities live. 
Reducing the appeal of day 
centres
There is also concern that through certain 
types of users being more inclined to take 
up direct payments than others, centre 
users will become much less mixed and 
therefore the experience of using them 
less enriching. The effect of ‘care in the 
community’ of keeping all but the most 
severely disabled out of residential homes, 
was to make them much less cheerful 
places and to increase their unit costs 
substantially to cope with greater average 
needs and higher turnover rates (through 
increased death rates). If the same 
happens to collective forms of care in the 
community, fewer people will want to use 
them and local authorities are unlikely to 
continue to fund them. These cuts will 
achieve savings on the social care budget 
and may release a valuable site for sale 
but at the expense of those who have lost 
higher quality collective provision. They will 
be left even more isolated.  
Negative impact on carers
Lack of available services can also have 
a negative impact on carers. “Cash 
payments alone, without appropriate 
services which they can be used to 
purchase, also risk institutionalising 
low paid or unpaid informal carers and 
trapping relatives in enforced dependency 
on the person they are caring for” 
(Glendinning and Bell 2008, p9).
The level of individual budgets 
and direct payments
There is no evidence that self-assessment 
of needs works in practice as a way of 
setting levels of direct payments. It would 
be surprising if it did, given a concern with 
fairness in the allocations of limited funds. 
The level of funding to individuals must 
eventually be down to government or local 
authorities. In practice complaints have 
been more about an inflexible system in 
which the budgets allocated for specific 
needs do not take account of the costs 
in meeting them arising from particular 
disabilities, or significantly disadvantage 
older people.
To some extent this is inevitable in such 
a system, since to have to account for 
every item for which funds are needed 
goes against the spirit of direct payments.  
However there are some principles that 
should be included in any system.
Avoiding the post-code lottery
The assessment of which needs are to 
covered should be done on a national 
basis, so that there is no ‘post-code 
lottery’ determining which needs are 
allowed for, even if there may have to be 
local assessment of how much it costs to 
meet those needs  (for example transport 
costs are quite different in rural and urban 
areas). This is the practice in many other 
countries. The process is likely to be 
more transparent when eligibility does 
not involve a means test and is either 
insurance-based or funded from general 
taxation. Compared with many other 
countries, the English system is particularly 
disjointed and heavily dependent upon 
the extensive use of means-testing of 
income and assets (Glendinning and 
Bell 2008). The proposed introduction in 
England of free personal care at home, 
already available in Scotland, is a welcome 
change in theory. In practice, however, if 
it is restricted to those with most severe 
needs, it amounts to little more than the 
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provision of continuing care services which 
once would have been provided free within 
the NHS. Even worse, it may involve cuts 
in other parts of social care budgets.
Support for ‘care brokers’
Personalisation brings into being a new 
role - that of a ‘care broker’ to support 
an individual budget or direct payment 
holder in choosing and commissioning the 
services they require. In many countries 
this is a separate role from the assessment 
of individual eligibility and the translation 
of that into an individual’s budget. Such a 
separation of roles follows from the logic of 
privatisation. The IBSEN study found that 
while local authorities were heavily involved 
in assessment, some local authorities 
used external independent brokers 
because they attached considerable 
importance to keeping the brokerage 
function separate from assessment. 
Comparative research suggests that this 
is a view which informs the delivery of 
social care policies elsewhere. However, 
it is important to recognise that both 
assessment of needs and helping people 
find the services that suit them best 
require considerable skills and experience. 
Whether based inside or external to the 
local authority, the staff undertaking these 
tasks need adequate support, training 
and pay. The development of systems of 
brokerage , and the difficulties of ensuring 
high-quality provision while making them 
truly independent, show that there are 
real limits to personalisation and self-
assessment in practice.
‘Carer-blind’ assessments
Assessments should be ‘carer-blind’ – 
they should not take account of whether 
there is an existing family carer, so that 
those who have previously relied on such 
carers should have the same opportunities 
to choose their form of care as those who 
have not. This both ensures that family 
carers have a choice as to whether to 
continue in that role, or to alter the terms 
on which they carry it out, and allows 
direct payment recipients the choice as 
to whether to use their direct payments 
to pay them. The interests of family carers 
may not always coincide with those of the 
person needing care. Indeed the IBSEN 
study found that this is one of the reasons 
some local authorities are reluctant to use 
direct payments or individual budgets to 
pay relatives. It is disappointing that it is 
proposed that the assessment for free 
personal home care in England will take 
account of any local- authority-funded 
support in cash or kind to their carers, 
especially as ‘intimate care’ is excluded 
from such support (Personal Home Care 
bill 2009). This may encourage the long 
standing practice of restricting publicly 
subsidised care to those without carers.
Adequate funding
Funding should be adequate to allow 
direct-payment holders to cover all 
associated employment costs, including 
replacement care during a personal 
assistant’s sickness or leave, training costs 
and tax and national insurance, as well 
as pay appropriate to qualifications and 
experience.
Levels of support should be continually 
reviewed since needs change; in particular 
older people’s needs tend to increase; all 
direct payment holders should have the 
right to a review of the level of their direct 
payments whenever requested and interim 
support provided in the meantime.
The relationship between direct 
payment holders and their 
personal assistants
Employment protection legislation 
has grown up over the years because 
individually generated contracts can be 
exploitive – in both directions. Some of 
the benefits claimed for being a direct- 
payment holder sound like those of a 
19th-century factory owner, able to hire 
and fire at will, secure complete working 
time flexibility and avoid health and safety 
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risk assessments which other employers 
have to adopt. It is important that the 
freedom that direct payments allow does 
not recreate old problems in this respect, 
particularly since the quality of care is so 
dependent on sustaining good working 
relationships.
Help payment holders become 
good employers
Direct-payment holders need guidance 
about the responsibilities and reasonable 
demands of employers.  It may be 
worth considering whether it would be 
better for the local authority to remain 
the employer, as is the case in some 
countries with longer experience of the 
use of direct payments. At the very least 
direct-payment holders should be given 
the choice of having the local authority as 
the employer. This might also make direct 
payments more attractive to those who 
do not want the responsibility of being an 
employer. Failing that, better advice needs 
to be given to direct-payment holders, in 
a form that is seen as helpful rather than 
controlling, about what to expect from 
personal assistants and the rights and 
possibilities of being an employer. For 
example, a range of standard contracts 
could be produced, which local authorities 
should endorse as the basis of the 
employment packages that they are willing 
to fund.
Training for personal assistants
Personal assistants need guidance about 
their role and responsibilities too. An 
induction course for personal assistants 
outlining their legal responsibilities, health 
and safety issues and ways of negotiating 
work practices with employers could 
be provided by local authorities. Such 
a course could also provide information 
about further training and encouragement 
to personal assistants to see the benefits 
to them and their employers of taking 
further training.
When things go wrong
We cannot assume that the best is always 
generalised. While not wishing to lose 
the benefits in terms of good personal 
relationships that existing informal working 
arrangements between direct payment 
holders and personal assistants often 
provide, these do not always work. More 
needs to be done for these cases. It is not 
acceptable to have created a large class 
of employment effectively exempt from 
good employment practices, either legally 
or through neglect. Further, it is reasonable 
to require some regulation of the way 
in which taxpayers money is spent on 
employing others. This is accepted in 
the case of childcare where tax credits 
can only be used to employ registered 
childminders; while registration of personal 
assistants may not be the solution here, 
some protection of both sides for cases 
where things go wrong is necessary.
Isolation and mutual learning 
from experience 
The setting up of local care associations 
involving both personal assistants and 
their employers, building on their shared 
interest in providing good quality care 
and working conditions, should be 
encouraged and financially supported 
by local authorities. These could provide 
some of the benefits that accrue to 
larger employers, by for example sharing 
the costs of training, covering absence 
through illness or family emergencies, 
while at the same time protecting personal 
assistants’ working conditions. Such an 
association could also help overcome one 
of the main problems of personalisation, 
the isolation and lack of experience of 
both direct payment holders and their 
personal assistants. This is not just a 
social problem; it also affects the quality 
of care since there is less learning from 
others’ experience. The requirement that 
all English local authorities should have 
a user group to support direct payment 
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and personal budget holders in place by 
2011 could provide an opportunity for the 
inclusion of representatives of personal 
assistants and other social care workers. 
This could be along the lines of UNISON’s 
partnership working with the Scottish 
Personal Assistance Employers Network 
(SPAEN).
Sustaining the care workforce
In order to create a sustainable workforce 
delivering good quality care, it will be 
necessary to bring in new sources of 
labour without undermining the conditions 
of the current workforce.  Traditionally care 
workers have been some of the least well 
remunerated sections of the workforce. 
Recruitment problems have meant new 
sources of more disadvantaged labour 
continually needed bringing in, whether it 
was unmarried women to staff residential 
care homes in the immediate post-war 
period, immigration from various parts of 
the world, or now - the government hopes 
- unpaid carers and unemployed young 
people on apprenticeship schemes.  
These new workforces need organising 
to ensure that they share in the rights that 
other workers have in the UK. This is not 
only to ensure that they help develop a 
sustainable care workforce in the UK, but 
also so that the conditions of the existing 
workforce are not undermined, worsening 
current retention and recruitment 
problems. Some of these issues are 
outlined below.
Immigration laws threaten 
workers’ rights
It is important that immigration regulations 
do not create a pool of less protected 
workers, either through illegality, or 
through not being offered the rights of 
other workers, for example to training. 
To build a sustainable workforce requires 
all workers have the same opportunities 
for training and progression; currently 
greater restrictions on the rights of recent 
immigrants mean that this is not case 
(Gordono and Lalani, 2009).
Agencies exploiting migrant 
workers
Homecare agencies and the more general 
employment agencies provide little or no 
support and some exploit the vulnerability 
and isolation of migrant workers (ibid). Any 
measures taken to make their regulation 
more effective would be of general benefit 
to the workforce as a whole. The Care 
Quality Commission in its first report 
stated that 30% of agencies provide no 
or inadequate supervision of staff  (CQC, 
2009).
More flexible working for carers
Various measures to help carers combine 
employment with caring responsibilities 
are important too. Although being a 
personal assistant can be a convenient 
job for people with their own informal 
caring responsibilities, no-one should 
have to become a personal assistant 
through lack of alternative employment. 
The right to request flexible working has 
already been extended to cover many of 
those caring for adults (indeed it would 
be better if that right covered workers 
without caring responsibilities too). Forms 
of leave for carers, paralleling those 
for parents, should also be developed. 
Overall, the ending of the UK’s opt-out 
of the EU Working Time Directive would 
be an important step towards weakening 
the ‘long-hours culture’ which limits and 
undermines so many caring activities.
Make social care a desirable 
career
The new apprenticeships in social care 
for young people will only be effective 
if a career structure exists. It is also 
important that the young people who 
take them up do so because they see 
social care as a desirable career, not just 
because they cannot find anything else 
to do. The selection process for these 
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apprenticeships should inform candidates 
of the real nature of care work.  Well 
motivated, trained young people could 
provide a much needed boost to the 
social-care workforce, but without any 
intrinsic motivation the care they provide 
could be of poor quality.  Care is too 
important to be treated just as a job of last 
resort.  
Equal opportunities for older 
women
It would also be good to try to expand 
the diversity of entrants into social care 
through apprenticeships, for example, 
by encouraging young men to enter 
the profession. At the same time, it is 
important that those on whom the care 
labour force has always depended, 
such as women whose children have 
grown up and now have more alternative 
opportunities for employment, remain 
encouraged into social care by having 
equal opportunities to train. Governments 
should give some thought to providing 
apprenticeships that are open to re-
entrants to the labour force in addition to 
these for young people, and removing the 
age qualification on them in the meantime, 
as has already happened in Scotland.
Training and career structure
Ultimately as a country we cannot rely on 
always finding new untapped sources of 
labour for the social care workforce. To 
train and expand the existing workforce it 
is important that a proper career structure 
for work in social care is created.  
This needs to encompass those personal 
assistants who wish to make a career 
in social care too. Good employers 
look after the development needs and 
career prospects of their staff, and direct 
payment holders as employers cannot 
be exempt from that responsibility. 
However, they need to be given support 
in doing so. Not only are earmarked 
funds required, that cannot be spent in 
other ways; training courses need to be 
provided and systems need to be set up 
to cover personal assistants’ absences. 
All this should be the responsibility of the 
local authority, but funded by government 
as a national concern with creating a 
sustainable workforce. Contracts with 
care providers should be dependent on 
their showing that their own employment 
practices make a contribution to creating 
such a workforce, by ensuring that their 
workers are given and take up training 
opportunities; otherwise as we have seen, 
employers have little incentive to do so.
Training by itself is not enough to create 
a career structure. Trained workers need 
to be given greater responsibilities and 
paid more as a result. That social-care 
providers do so should be requirement 
of their contracts, and direct payment 
holders could be encouraged, for example 
though the organisations suggested 
above, to enable personal assistants 
to mentor each other and share work 
experiences (in some case, this might also 
help break down the isolation of the care 
recipients).  All this needs careful thought, 
but cannot be ignored.  Much more 
needs to be done to support personal 
assistants, otherwise the short-term boost 
to the social-care workforce that personal 
assistants have provided will be lost. 
Carers learn to care for particular people 
and some direct-payment holders are 
only concerned with training them to meet 
their own needs. However, it is in the 
interests of society as a whole to improve 
the skills of the care workforce to improve 
the quality of care more generally. The 
need for support and training for personal 
assistants is beginning to be mentioned 
in the latest policy documents. However, 
for reasons discussed above, the issue of 
training is not just one of funding. Current 
structures to access funds are failing for 
the reasons discussed above. 
There is a role for unions to access some 
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of these funds in order to support and 
develop the skills of personal assistants. 
In Finland older care workers are being 
encouraged to provide training, mentoring 
and information to newer entrants to the 
social care workforce. “Retaining the 
experience and expertise of older social 
care workers is an essential element of 
maintaining high quality standards in 
care provision” (European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 2006, p29). With a large 
number of older care workers in the public 
sector coming up for retirement (many 
of them members of UNISON), there is 
a wealth of experience which could be 
used to develop the human capital of the 
next generation of social care workers, 
including personal assistants of all ages. 
They could be an important resource 
for the new apprenticeship schemes. In 
the child-care sector, the National Child 
Minders’ Association is funded with public 
money to train its members.
The skills involved in care work must be 
more fully recognized and valued. The 
ILO defines care workers as those who 
provide routine personal care, such as 
bathing, dressing, or grooming, to the 
elderly, convalescent or disabled persons 
in their own homes or in independent 
residential care facilities. There is now a 
medical dimension which was not present 
in the job description negotiated 20 years 
ago (see p 7 above) and forbidden 50 
years ago. Their tasks now include:
•	 maintaining records of client care, 
condition, progress, or problems, 
reporting and discussing observations 
with supervisor, or referring concerns 
to appropriate nursing, medical or 
social service workers
•	 helping clients to move in and out of 
beds, wheelchairs or vehicles, and 
with bathing, toilet, dressing and 
grooming
•	 providing patients and families with 
emotional support and instruction 
in areas such as caring for infants, 
preparing healthy meals, living 
independently or adapting to disability 
or illness
•	 changing bed linen, washing and 
ironing patients’ laundry, and cleaning 
patients’ quarters
•	 entertaining, conversing with, or 
reading aloud to patients to keep them 
mentally healthy and alert
•	 planning, purchasing, preparing, 
or serving meals to patients or 
other family members, according to 
prescribed diets
•	 ensuring that persons take prescribed 
medication at the right times and 
assisting them with their medication if 
required.
(ILO Draft ISCO-08 Group Definitions: 
Occupations in health. Updating the 
International Standard Definition of 
Occupation, 27 April 2009. Cited in 
Gordolan and Lalani, 2009, p9)
Now that social care has expanded to 
include some aspects of health care, the 
boundaries between health and social 
care are becoming more blurred. If these 
boundaries are not to become barriers to 
the detriment of both givers and receivers 
of care, it is even more vital that heath 
and social care workers work closely and 
possibly train together. Again there are 
interesting parallels with childcare where, 
over the last 10 years, far greater attention 
has been paid to developing some joint 
training and qualifications, as well as 
working across the education and care 
boundaries. These developments have 
occurred because the state rather than the 
market has both initiated and developed 
them. 
Trade unions
The development of personalisation and 
the expansion of the social care workforce 
provide some new challenges for trade 
unions. The extent to which migrant 
workers and personal assistants are 
kept on the margins of the social-care 
workforce by weak regulation, poor pay 
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and conditions and lack of opportunities to 
progress could have a deleterious impact 
on the core social-care workforce, as 
well as on these groups themselves. This 
in turn risks reducing the quality of care 
provided across the whole sector and 
therefore rebounds on those needing care. 
Immigrant workers, personal assistants 
and those on new apprenticeships will 
have to be organised too, if they are not to 
undermine conditions achieved by unions 
for their members.  However the very 
conditions that make these new types of 
workers potential new recruits to social-
care workforce make them harder to 
organise. But not to do so risks worsening 
not only their conditions of employment, 
but also those of the more organised 
public sector work force. Unions therefore 
need to:
•	 challenge restrictions on migrant 
workers to ensure that once in the 
UK they have the same access to 
education, training and employment 
opportunities as the existing workforce 
•	 support the development of effective 
regulation of the employment agencies 
who recruit care workers from 
overseas. For example, the proposal 
that they be included in the remit of 
the Gangmasters Licensing Authority 
(Kalaayan, 2009) 
•	 set up programmes specifically 
to recruit personal assistants and 
address their concerns
•	 get involved in setting up the new 
traineeships and apprenticeships, 
influencing their content as far as 
possible, and making clear the 
benefits of union membership and 
protection
•	 set up a comprehensive advice 
and support service for personal 
assistants. This might be one way 
in which some of the many recently 
retired, highly experienced home-care 
workers might become involved.  A 
helpline for personal assistants and 
domestic-care workers such as the 
one which Counsel and Care provides 
and operates for older people, their 
families and unpaid carers could be 
part of this service. In contrast to 
nannies and au pairs, those caring 
for adults may have few opportunities 
to leave the home of those they are 
caring for if they are living in. If they are 
also recent migrants they may be very 
isolated indeed
•	 find ways of supporting personal 
assistants by collectively negotiating 
contracts, terms and conditions. 
Unions could also step in to help create 
institutional forms that are missing in 
this market way of organising care. For 
example, they could, like in LA county, 
make common cause with care recipients; 
in the UK they could help set up the 
sort of joint organisation talked about in 
the ‘Isolation and mutual learning from 
experience’ section, above. Unions could 
themselves, if local authorities fail to do 
so, draft model employment contracts 
for personal assistants.  Many direct- 
payment holders are keen to have some 
of transaction costs of being an employer 
taken off their hands. Unions could 
help do this and in so doing protect the 
interests of personal assistants as well. 
They could also be active advocates or 
even providers of better training facilities.
Funding
As argued throughout this report, none 
of the benefits of personalisation will be 
achieved if funding is insufficient. Two-
fold government reasoning in support of 
personalisation, that it can deliver services 
people actually want and reduce costs, 
suggests that this is a serious concern. 
There is little prospect in the UK of raising 
extra funds for social care out of general 
taxation.
This will be unsustainable in the long 
run. As argued earlier, the costs of care 
services rise faster than those of other 
sectors, so funding has to rise faster than 
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inflation. Even if there were a constant 
proportion of the population needing care, 
funding would have to rise in line with 
GDP. That would be the case even if the 
proportion of the population needing care 
remained constant, the proportion of care 
provided by unpaid carers remained the 
same and wages did not need to rise to 
sustain the care workforce. None of these 
conditions hold in practice, which means 
care will have to take a rising share of 
GDP. This should not be a problem, since 
rising costs of care result from tax payers 
getting richer rather than poorer, and 
would still leave them better off.  However, 
it appears that no political party at the 
moment is willing to admit that reality and 
argue that higher taxes will be needed to 
pay for a social care system that reaches 
all. There is an argument to be had 
therefore with all of them.
One worry is that personalisation is a 
way to push that inconvenient truth on 
to care recipients themselves, since it 
will be easier for local authorities (and 
indirectly the government) to fail to raise 
direct payments and individual budgets in 
line with rising wages than to cut services 
directly. The assessment of the level of 
such payments and budgets is already 
recognised to be problematic. To ensure 
that payments keep up with costs, an 
independent auditing commission should 
be set up to monitor their levels to ensure 
that if payments do not rise as fast as 
costs, the implications of this political 
choice are known. Putting pressure on 
government to set up such a commission, 
or even directly setting up a shadow 
commission to operate in this way, is 
another potential role for the unions.
The decades-old split between health and 
social care budgets at local and national 
level has seriously distorted social care 
policies as budget holders have tried to 
shift costs from health to social care. It 
cannot be assumed that markets will 
develop unaided or indeed will develop at 
all in some parts of the country. Ensuring 
good care provision will require sustained 
attention and help to direct payment and 
individual budget holders when the market 
does not provide. It would be unwise to 
assume that this will be possible without 
any public services or without doing more 
to support paid as well as unpaid carers. 
To succeed in providing good quality 
social care to all who need it, adult care 
provision will have to change from being 
the poor relation of the NHS. Above all, 
care - and those who give it whether paid 
or unpaid - will have to be more highly 
valued.
59
References
Audit Commission ( 2004) Older People: Independence and Well-being. Audit 
Commission, 2004
Baxter, K, Glendinning, C Clarke, S and Greener, K (2008) Domiciliary Care Agency 
Responses to Increased User Choice: Perceived threats, barriers and opportunities from 
a changing market. DH 2263 SPRU, University of York
Campbell, J (2006) ‘Direct Payments: the heart of independent living’ in Leece and 
Bornat, op cit pp130-1
Cangiano, A, Shutes, I, Spencer, S and Leeson, G (2009) Migrant Care Workers in 
Ageing Societies. Oxford: COMPAS 
Care Quality Commission (2009) The Quality and Capacity of Adult Social Care 
Services 2008-09
CSCI (2006) Time to Care? Elderly People and the Home Care Service. CSCI
CSCI (2009) The State of Social Care in England 2007-2008. Department of Health 
(DH)
Community Care (2009) ‘Personalisation; Councils given benchmarks on progress’, 
10 Sept 2009
Daly, M (2001) Care Work. ILO
Davey, V, Snell, T, Fernande, J, Knapp, M, Tobin, R and Jolly, D (2007) Schemes 
Providing Support to People Using Direct Payments: A UK survey. PSSRU
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (Northern Ireland) (2007) 
‘Direct Payments-Training of Personal Assistants‘, letter to Chief Executives of HSC 
Trusts and HSS Boards, 11 May 2007
DH (2009a) Putting People First: Transforming adult social care. DH
DH (2009b) Working to Put People First: The strategy for the adult social care workforce 
in England. DH 
DHSS (1988) Annual Report. HMSO
DHSS (1977) The Way Forward. HMSO
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006) 
Employment and Social Care in Europe 
Frontier Economics (2006) Choice in the Delivery of Local Government: A report 
prepared for the Audit Commission. The Audit Commission
Gilbert, N (2002) Transformations of the Welfare State. Princeton University Press
Glendinning, C, Arksey, H, Jones, K, Moran, N, Netten, A and Rabiee, P (2009) The 
Individual Budgets Pilot Projects Impact and Outcomes for Carers DH Working Paper 
2298. SPRU
Glendinning, C and Bell, D (2008) Rethinking social care support: what can England 
learn from other countries? JRF
Glendinning, C, Challis, D, Fernandez, J, Jacobs, S, Jones, K, Knapp, M, Manthorpe, J, 
Moran, N, Netten, A Stevens, M and Wilberforce, M (2008) Evaluation of the Individual 
Budgets Pilot Programme (IBSEN), Final Report. DH
Glendinning, C and Kemp, P eds (2006) Cash and Care. Policy Press
Glendinning, C and Moran, B (2009) Working Paper DHP 2318. DH
Glennerster, H with Korman, N and Marsden-Wilson, F (1983) Planning for Priority 
Groups. Robertson 
60
Gordolan, L and Lalani, M (2009) Care and Immigration: migrant care workers in private 
households. Kalayaan
Green Paper (2009) Shaping the Future of Care Together, Cm 7673. TSO
Griffiths, R (1988) Community Care: Agenda for action, report to the Secretary of State 
for Social Security by Sir Roy Griffiths. HMSO
Hasler, F (2006) ‘The Direct Payments Development Fund’ in Leece and Bornat, op cit 
pp 149-158
Hunt, A (1968) Women and Employment. HMSO
Hunt, A (1970) The Home Help Service. HMSO
IFF Research (2008) The Employment Aspects and Workforce Implications of Direct 
Payments. Skills for Care
Individual Budget Evaluation Network (IBSEN) (2007) Individual Budgets: An Evaluation: 
A Summary of Early Findings. SPRU, University of York
Knijn T (2000) ‘Marketisation and the struggling logics of home care in the Netherlands’ 
in Harrington Meyer, M ed Care Work, Gender, Labour and the Welfare State. Routledge
Keigher, S (2007) ‘Consumer-direction in an  “Ownership Society”: An Emerging 
Paradigm for Home and Community Care in the United States’ in Ungerson and Yeandle 
op. cit. 
Land, H and Parker, R (1977) ‘Family Policy in Britain: the hidden dimensions’  in Kahn, 
A and Kammerman, S eds Family Policy in Fourteen Countries. Columbia University 
Press
Land, H (1988) ‘Social Security and Community Care: Creating perverse incentives‘ in 
Baldwin, S, et al (Eds) Social Security and Community Care. Gower
Leadbeater, C, Bartlett, J and Gallagher, N (2008)  Making it Personal. Demos
Leece, J (2008) ‘Personalisation: Who cares about personal assistants?’ Community 
Care, 24 Nov 2008
Leece, J and Bornat, J (2006) Developments in Direct Payments. Policy Press 
Le Grand, J (2007) The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice 
and Competition. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Lewis, J (1997) ‘Community Care’ in Evandrou, M ed Baby Boomers Ageing in the 21st 
Century. Age Concern England
Low Pay Commission (2009) National Minimum Wage Report. 2009
Lundesgard (2005) Consumer Direction and Choice in Long Term Care for Elder 
Persons: How can it help improve care outcomes, employment and sustainability? 
OECD
Martin, C and Le Bihan, B (2007) ’Cash for Care in the French Welfare State: A skilful 
compromise?’ in Ungerson and Yeandle  op cit
Mickel, A  (2009) ‘Who is responsible for personal assistant’s pay and conditions?’, 
Community Care, 6 July 2009
Morris, J (2006)  ‘Independent Living: the role of the disability movement in the 
development of government policy‘ in Glendinning, C and Kemp, P (eds) op. cit
Parker, R (1988) ‘An Historical Background’ in Sinclair I (ed) op cit
Parker, R (1990a) ‘Care and the Private Sector’ in Sinclair, I , Parker, R, Leat, D and 
Williams (eds) op cit 
Parker, R (1990b) ‘Elderly People and Community Care: The policy background’ in 
61
Sinclair, I ,Parker, R, Leat, D and Williams (eds) op.cit 
Pearson, C (2006) ‘Direct Payments in Scotland’ in Leece and Bornat, op cit pp 33-48
Robbins, D (2008) Criteria for Care: Assessing eligibility for longer term care services in 
Europe. SCIE
Sense (2008) Deafblind Direct Consultation Report: People and families’ experience of 
direct payments. Sense
Sinclair and Williams (1990) ‘Domiciliary Service’ in Sinclair, I Parker, R, Leat, D and 
Williams eds op cit
Sinclair I (ed) (1988) Residential Care: The research reviewed. HMSO
Sinclair I (1988) ‘Elderly’ in Sinclair I (ed) op cit 
Sinclair, I Parker, R, Leat, D and Williams (eds) (1990) The Kaleidoscope of Care. HMSO
Skills for Care (2008) Annual Workforce Report 2008. Skills for Care
SPAEN, 2009 Creating and Supporting an Informed Employer and Employee 
Relationship within the Self Directed Support Sector Final Report.
Stone, D (2000) ‘Caring by the Book’ in Harrington Meyer, M Care Work: Gender labour 
and the welfare state
Sutherland, S (2009) Independent Review of Free Personal and Nursing Care in 
Scotland
The Royal Commission on Long Term Care (1999) With Respect to Old Age Cm 4192
Theobald, H Burau, V and Blank, R (2007) Choice in Home-based Elder-care in Different 
European Contexts: Conflicts and outcomes in combining different logics. Paper 
presented at the 5th ESPAnet conference, Vienna 
Tidder L (2006) ‘Not just an assistant, but also a friend’ in Leece and Bornat, op cit 
pp130-1
Townsend, P (1962) The Last Refuge : A survey of residential institutions and homes for 
the aged in England and Wales. Routledge
TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment (2009) Report
Ungerson (2004) ‘Whose Empowerment and Independence? A cross-national 
perspective in ‘cash for care’ schemes’, Ageing and Society vol 24.2 pp189-212
Ungerson, C (2006) ‘Direct payments and the employment relationship: some insights 
from cross-national research’ in Leece and Bornat  op cit
Ungerson, C and Yeandle, S (eds) (2007) Cash for Care in Developed Welfare States. 
Palgrave Macmillan 
Walsh, J (2001) ‘Creating Unions, Creating Employers: A Los Angeles home-care 
campaign’ in Daly, M (ed). ILO 
Wanless, D (2006) Securing Good Care for Older People. Kings Fund
Yeandle, S and Steill, B (2007) ‘Issues in the Development of the Direct Payments 
Scheme for Older People in England’ in Ungerson and Yeandle (eds) Cash for Care in 
Developed Welfare States. Palgrave Macmillan, pp104-136
Yeandle, S, Shipton, L and Buckner L (2006) Local Challenges in Meeting Demand for 
Domiciliary Care. Centre for Social Inclusion, Sheffield Hallam University
62
The authors would like to thank the following interviewees for their time. All views 
expressed in this report are the authors’ own
Rob Bailey, principal adviser, Association for Public Service Excellence
Sue Brown, head of campaigns and public policy, Sense
Jo Cleary, executive director adult and community services, Lambeth
Stephen Lowe, social care and quality policy adviser, Age Concern
Francis McGlone, senior policy officer, UK Home Care Association
Catherine Needham, department of politics, Queen Mary University of London
Margaret O’Kane, chair of regional direct payment development group, Northern Ireland
Chris Rafferty, adult care and support, Scottish Office
Ann Roberts, chief executive, Crossroads
63
If you are not a member join 
UNISON online at  
unison.org.uk/join or 
call 0845 355 0845.
Designed and produced by UNISON Communications.  
Published by UNISON, 1 Mabledon Place, London WC1H 9AJ 
unison.org.uk CU/MARCH2010/19020/StOCk NO. 2892
